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Abstract
Comprehensive permitting is one response to the complex land
development process resulting from a proliferation of regulatory agencies at
different levels of government. Over time, it has become increasingly
difficult for developers to meet the requirements of regulatory agencies which
have conflicting agendas and statutory requirements. Traditionally,
developers must seek approval from multiple agencies with jurisdiction
over, or an interest in proposed development projects.
Comprehensive permitting, where only a single board or multi-agency
panel reviews development proposals for applicable federal, state, and local
interests and policies, is one way of simplifying the development approval
process. The Massachusetts comprehensive permit, created by law in 1969, is
one example of the use of comprehensive permitting.
I analyzed three cases from the Town of Yarmouth, Massachusetts. My
goal was to determine the extent to which comprehensive permitting
eliminates the problems caused by the increased number of agencies and
regulations. I found that while duplicative efforts and whipsawing are
eliminated, developers are still subject to lengthy approval processes and
multiple pressures to redesign their proposals. The decision-making board in
the comprehensive permit process must still reconcile many different
interests, understand complex technical information, and consider their
political position when reviewing development. I conclude that
comprehensive permitting must be thought of as a negotiation and not only
as a streamlined development review process.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Wheeler
Senior Lecturer
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF COMPREHENSIVE
PERMITTING
1.1 Introduction
Comprehensive permitting is one response to the complex land
development process resulting from a proliferation of regulatory agencies at
different levels of government. Traditionally, developers must seek approval
from many different permitting agencies with jurisdiction over, or an interest
in proposed development projects. Each agency reviews development
proposals from its own standpoint. Over time, as the number of required
approvals increased, it became more difficult for developers to meet the
requirements of regulatory agencies with conflicting agendas and statutory
requirements. 1 One critic of the development permitting process explained,
"Different agencies perceive threats, risks, and uncertainty differently and
when all this goes into the decision-making process, there are different
conclusions."2
Comprehensive permitting, where a single board or multi-agency
panel reviews development proposals for applicable federal, state, and local
interests and policies, is one way of simplifying the development approval
process and reducing costs. Experience with comprehensive permitting has
been mixed. In some communities that have used comprehensive
permitting, local officials and developers argued that it successfully simplified
the process by reducing uncertainty, delay, and duplication. In other
communities, local officials and developers claimed that attempts at
1* Noble, et. al. eds. Groping Through the Maze. Page 19.
2. Noble, et. al. eds. Groping Through the Maze. Page 20.
comprehensiveness only resulted in another layer of bureaucracy, increasing
costs and further delaying the final decision.3
In 1969, the Massachusetts Committee on Urban Affairs recognized that
regulatory barriers were preventing the construction of affordable housing.
These barriers were addressed in the 1969 Anti-Snob Zoning Act both
substantively by giving power to override local zoning to a special State
Housing Appeals Committee and procedurally by authorizing developers to
apply for a single comprehensive permit from the local Zoning Board "
Appeals in lieu of all other local permits. 4 The comprehensive permit was
supposed to simplify the development review process for affordable housing
projects.
In this thesis, I analyze two development projects which were
approved using the comprehensive permit process and one project which
was approved using the traditional development review process. My goal is
to determine the extent to which comprehensive permitting eliminates the
problems caused by the increased number of agencies and regulations. I
found that comprehensive permitting is not sufficient by itself. While
duplication and whipsawing are eliminated, developers are still subject to
lengthy approval processes and multiple pressures to redesign proposals. I
also found the Zoning Board of Appeals must still reconcile many different
interests, understand complex technical information, and consider their
political position when reviewing development. I conclude that
3. Many local and state permit coordination programs are briefly analyzed
in: Bosselman, et.al., eds. The Permit Explosion.
4. Chapter 774 of the Acts of 1969 (codified as 760 CMR 30.00 et. seq.).
comprehensive permitting must be thought of as a negotiation and not only
as a streamlined development review process.
In this first chapter, I give a brief overview of the expansion of
environmental and land use control agencies and the problems associated
with this increase. I also describe comprehensive permitting in general and
its various forms. Chapter 2 describes the Massachusetts comprehensive
permit process in some detail. Chapter 3 presents three development
permitting case studies (all in the Town of Yarmouth, Massachusetts on Cape
Cod). One project was approved through the traditional development review
process. The other two were approved through the comprehensive permit
process. Chapter 4 analyzes these cases, discussing to what extent the goals of
comprehensive permitting were met. Finally, Chapter 5 suggests that to meet
its intended goals, comprehensive permitting should be thought of as a
negotiation and not simply as a streamlined development review process.
1.2 Multiplication of Land Use and Environmental Controls
The 1960s saw an increased awareness of the impacts of development
on the environment. Unprecedented environmental problems were created
by residential, commercial, and industrial growth. Cities grew outward and
encompassed rural, agricultural, and marginally developable land such as
hillsides and flood plains. Catastrophic events occurred, such as the 1969
Santa Barbara oil spill. Also, books began featuring the effects of
environmental pollution.5 Environmental issues once disregarded in favor
5. This increase in awareness is discussed by many authors. See for
example: Frieden. The Environmental Protection Hustle Popper. The
Politics of Land Use Reform. and Vig and Kraft. Environmental Policy in
the 1990s.
of economic development or thought only to be local, were recognized as
having serious impacts which affected a great many people.
With this recognition came a desire to regulate development with
widespread impacts. "State, regional, or even federal action is necessary
where a regulatory decision significantly affects people in more than one
locality."6 The National Environmental Policy Act, numerous new laws, and
amendments to existing legislation regarding air quality, coastal and marine
areas, endangered spe-ies, forestry, mining, resource recovery, toxic
substances, water quality, and other substantive areas all provided for
additional state and federal interest in and control over local land use.7
Centralizing regulation, however, did not replace local zoning and
environmental regulation; rather it added to it. This supplementing of local
regulation took many forms: (1) separate layers of regulation imposed on top
of local zoning, (2) procedural or substantive standards for local zoning
decisions, (3) entirely new powers on state, regional, or federal agencies, and
(4) shifts of power from local to higher-level government. 8
Land use and environmental decisions which had been entirely local
before were now subject to regional, state, and federal intervention. Land
development became more complex because approvals were needed from
many agencies at different levels of government. The process was further
6. Reilly, ed. The Use of Land: A Citizen's Policy Guide to Urban Growth.
Page 27.
7. Vig and Kraft, eds. Environmental Policy in the 1990s. Vig and Kraft
discuss the increase in environmental regulation in the 1960s and 1970s.
8. Popper. The Politics of Land Use Reform. Popper describes these
methods for centralization and analyzes examples of each.
complicated by the increasing number and wider scope of challenges to
development which resulted from new legislation encompassing new
substantive areas and giving standing to many more people.
And this additional regulation did not occur all at once. New
environmental issues were (and still are) continually finding their way to the
political agenda. Perfectly justifiable regulations and the necessary
enforcement mechanisms were adopted incrementally, seemingly without
regard for the design of the overall environmental regulatory system. Where
new regulations could have come under the mandate of existing agencies,
instead, new agencies with narrow mandates were created. Regulations
between agencies were repetitive, conflicting, and confusing.9 How could
developers decide what trade-offs they could make when designing their
projects when each agency insisted that its own requirements be satisfied. For
example, if a development had a choice between occupying prime agricultural
land or affecting a sensitive wildlife area, how should the trade-off be made?
A Ford Foundation study concluded:
For the most part.. .new laws attacked environmental problems
piecemeal. Nearly every level of government operated separate
agencies to deal with air and water pollution, the discharge of
solid waste, the protection of land and wildlife, and the
treatment of solid waste. There was little recognition that these
functions are interrelated and interdependent. 10
9. For further discussion of repetitive, conflicting, and confusing
regulations, see: Bosselman, et. al. The Permit Explosion: Coordination
of the Proliferation. Kolis, ed. Thirteen Perspectives on Regulatory
Simplification, and Noble, et. al. eds. Groping Through the Maze.
10. Noble, Groping Through the Maze. Page 27, quoted from: The Ford
Foundation, The Art of Managing the Environment. (1974) Page 3-4.
Not only were the number of regulations (and required permits)
increasing, but decisions were becoming more discretionary, making getting
approval more difficult.11 The once straight-forward requirements, telling
where specific uses could be located, evolved into a more discretionary system
of approval, where one or more agencies could look at whether the uses were
needed in an area and if a specific project met more general planning, health,
safety, and other criteria. Also, new regulations required the evaluation of a
project's specific impacts on the environment where science did not yet
understand the issue. Different "experts" had different opinions on what
would be the potential effects. That different agencies could have different
information or interpret the same information differently, it is no wonder
that developers were frustrated at having to assemble many approvals.
"[This] growing dissatisfaction with the complexity of governmental processes
associated with the proliferation of permits provid[ed] grounds for serious
concern. "12
1.3 Problems With the Proliferation of Permits
There are many problems associated with the proliferation of permits
required at the local level. There is repetition for both developers and town
boards, whipsawing of developers (meeting conflicting requirements), costs of
delay, uncertainty of outcome, overall complexity of the process (what
permits are required and in what sequence, scoping for information, and
evaluation standards), and reconciling competing interests in designing the
project.
11. Mandelker, Daniel R. "Regulatory Simplification: An Overview." in
Kolis, ed. Thirteen Perspectives on Regulatory Simplification.
12. Bosselman, et. al. The Permit Explosion: Coordination of the
Proliferation. Page ix.
Repetition came (and still comes) in many forms. Some boards
required separate preliminary and final reviews and, due to overlapping
jurisdictions, some boards mimicked the same "concerns" of other boards.
Even where mandates differed, there was nothing to stop one board from
expressing concern about issues beyond its mandate. For each approval,
developers needed to submit applications, meet information demands, and
perhaps present the proposal at a hearing. Whipsawing occurred because in
order to meet conflicting requirements, developers needed to seek waivers or
re-approval from boards who had already given approval on the original
design. Pinball tactics, being bounced from one board to another and
sometimes back again, made the meeting all the varying interests and
regulations difficult. A California study explained that "sometimes one
agency does the work of another and sometimes one undoes the work of
another. There are many pieces to the picture; but they do not add up to a
single whole... "13
As a result of the proliferation of regulation, developers spent more
time just assembling all the necessary approvals before construction could
begin. It took a great deal of time to attend so many hearings and compile
information to meet the demands of each permitting board. Where new
information was requested, developers had to wait for boards to re-evaluate
the proposal against the new information. And there was much uncertainty
too. Getting approval from one board did not necessarily means that the next
13. Noble, Groping Through the Maze. Page 27, quoted from: California
Land Use Task Force. The California Land: Planning for People. (1975)
Page 13.
board would give approval. In effect, one board had a multiple veto over the
others; one denial and the developer must start over again. Where there was
a change of decision-makers or regulations, the originally conceived project
was again subject to re-evaluation. If a proposal had not yet been approved,
developers faced the possibility of starting over again to meet new political
interests or regulations.
The complexity of the process was another problem. With so many
boards, it was often difficult to determine which boards would need to give
approval, what was the required sequencing of approvals, what information
would be needed to satisfy each board, and what evaluation methods would
be applied to the project. With the repetition, whipsawing, uncertainty, and
complexity, development became more risky, and matching these risks, was
costly.
Evaluating what costs are attributable to regulation is difficult. There
are both costs due to the substance of the regulations and costs due to the
process. Costs due to the substance of regulations include such costs as
development impact fees, exactions, and rising land costs due to growth
limiting regulations. Costs due to lengthening the process might include
higher interest rates, increased costs of holding land, increases in inflation,
and greater "cushions." Studies concerning the costs of regulation generally
have not distinguished between substantive and procedural costs. 14 While
14. Two studies give estimates of costs due to regulation. It is unclear how
much is due to substance and how much is due to process. In San Jose in
1976, at least 20-30 percent of the cost of housing was estimated to be due
to growth management policies (ULI and Gruen, Gruen and Associates,
developers are concerned about both substantive and procedural costs, the
problems of repetition, whipsawing, uncertainty, and complexity, for which
comprehensive permitting is meant to address, are all procedural costs.
Consumers and government officials also complained of increasing
costs. It is not clearly understood to what extent developers passed their
increased costs to consumers, but it is generally agreed that consumers were
paying some of these costs by raising prices of homes, rents, and leases. For
government, there were new agen-ies to be funded and regulations to be to
established where none (or little) existed before. Government had to provide
infrastructure in previously rural and agricultural areas along the outskirts of
town or they lost potential tax revenues as development moved outward to
other towns in search of more congenial sites to build. The loss of open space
and agricultural land was an unintended consequence. And this sprawl
pattern of development is an efficient use of land. 15
1.4 Joint Hearings as a Response to the Proliferation
Given that the development review is costly to developers,
government agencies, and consumers, each has some interest in simplifying
the regulatory process. Developers have a major interest in eliminating
repetitious applications and hearings, eliminating whipsawing, and reducing
costs through expediting and clarifying the process. Government agencies, in
the interest of reducing costs and providing better public service, ought to
1977); in Houston in 1978, costs associated with regulation increased the
price of housing by approximately 10 percent (ULI and Rice Center, 1979).
15. Frieden, Bernard J. "The Consumer's Stake in Environmental
Regulation." in Kolis, ed. Thirteen Perspectives on Regulatory
Simplification.
strive to make the regulatory process more efficient without compromising
the quality of review. Certainly eliminating duplication and clarifying the
process achieves these goals. Consumers are interested in reducing
developers' costs which might be passed on to them and in ensuring that they
are getting high-quality products. Simplifying the process means different
things to the different parties, but each parties' call for simplification is a
reaction to the same problem, the proliferation of regulatory agencies and
required permits.
Comprehensive permitting, where a single board or multi-agency
panel reviews a development application for applicable federal, state, and
local interests and policies, is one method of simplifying the development
review process. Comprehensive permitting is a cousin of the joint hearing
suggested by the American Law Institute in their Model Land Development
Code. 16 Employing a joint hearing, argued the ALI, would simplify and speed
up the administrative process, but not change the substantive standards for
each permit to be issued.
As originally designed, developers who needed multiple approvals
would first reference a permit register which listed all permits required by
government agencies. Developers would then file applications for each
permit required, but rather than each agency holding an individual hearing
on each permit application, a single (joint) hearing would be held in which
all agencies issuing permits would participate. The hearing would result in a
16. The American Law Institute. A Model Land Development Code. Page
102.
group recommendation which would be binding unless, within a specified
time, a permitting agency issued another decision.
Because the Model Land Development Code was only a "model," local
governments tailored the joint hearing idea to their own needs. There seem
to be two basic models for the make-up of the board holding the single
hearing: (1) a multi-agency panel with representatives from each different
permitting agency, and (2) one already existing agency given a new role to
determine that all the interests of other agencies are met.17 Also, the type of
decision resulting form the joint hearing differs. In some communities the
decision is final, whereas in others the decision is merely a recommendation.
There is disagreement over what is the best model for the agency or whether
the result of the hearing is binding, but whatever the specifics, the models all
address the same perceived problem.
Supporters of the existing agency model claimed that, "Time and effort
might be saved if some agency or agency official would have ultimate
authority to approve the project."18 In addition to saving time and money,
proponents of the existing agency approach argued that only where all
concerns are combined into one decision may tradeoffs between conflicting
community policies be addressed and resolved. Because there is a large
number of agencies involved in environmental and land use regulation, the
exchange of information is hindered, delays are incurred, and overlapping
17. For different ways which joint hearings can be structured, see:
Bosselman, et.al. The Permit Explosion, Kolis, ed. Thirteen Perspectives
on Regulatory Simplification, and the American Law Institute. A Model
Land Development Code.
18. Kolis. "Regulation Where Do We Go From Here? Part 2," Page 7.
jurisdictions confuse who has authority. "A single comprehensive decision
should be a more accurate reflection of the community's values and opinions
than the sum of the decisions of single-issue permits. 19 Perhaps this is an
optimistic view of comprehensive permitting. Is it really enough to only set
up the comprehensive decision-making forum, or must the substantive
issues also be worked through the political process. This idea is addressed in
Chapters 4 and 5.
Critics of the mult, agency panel claim that it is merely another level of
bureaucracy to the already complex process. Proponents of the multi-agency
panel approach argue that "the delegation of all authority over land use and
environmental issues to a single 'czar' cannot, realistically speaking, be
accomplished. The issues are too complex; our political institutions, too
varied. "20
While there is disagreement over whether using an existing agency or
using an interagency panel is better, there is agreement that joint hearings
offer a more unified look at development, a joint hearing should not become
another level of bureaucracy, and the decision-making body should be able to
adequately evaluate substantive issues. 21
19. Wickersham, Kirk Jr. "Breckenridge, Colorado: An Experiment in
Regulatory Simplification." in Kolis, ed. Page 88.
20. Bosselman, et. al. Page 5. See also: Searles, Duane L. and Sharon M.
Canavan. "Land Use Planning, Zoning , and the Development Process."
in Kolis, ed., Page 103.
21. Bosselman, et. al. looks at the experience in a number of communities
such as Fairfax County, Virginia, Dade County, Florida, and Los Angeles,
California
In this thesis, I analyze the comprehensive permit authorized in the
Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zoning Act.22 In this model, developers apply to an
existing board (the Zoning Board of Appeals) for one approval in lieu of all
other local level permits. The Zoning Board of Appeals issues a decision
which is binding upon the other town boards.
1.5 Comprehensive Permitting in Massachusetts
The Massachusetts Legislature, in enacting the Anti-Snob Zoning Act
in 1969, found that "necessary land in [less densely populated areas] is
unavailable [for affordable housing] because of restrictive zoning controls or
similar local regulations. Moreover, where land is available, the process of
obtaining local approval is so protracted as to discourage all but the most
determined and well-financed builders who often do not have the
community at heart."23 These regulatory barriers were addressed both
substantively by giving local zoning override power to a special Housing
Appeals Committee, and procedurally by authorizing developers to apply for
a single comprehensive permit in lieu of all other local permits.
Comprehensive permitting is one element in the Massachusetts Anti-
Snob Zoning Act, but the potential for state override of local zoning is also
important because it helps shape the decision whether to approve, approve
with conditions, or deny a comprehensive permit. Developers may appeal to
a special State Housing Appeals Committee if they have been denied a
comprehensive permit or have had conditions attached to their approval
which render their project uneconomic. If the Housing Appeals Committee
22* MGL c. 40B §§ 20-23 (also known as Chapter 774 of the Acts of 1969).
23. 760 CMR 30.01 (2)
determines that a need for affordable housing exists and that general health,
safety and planning factors are met, they will overturn the Zoning Board of
Appeals' decision, regardless of the specific zoning requirements of the site.
Not surprisingly, there are both supporters and opponents of the
comprehensive permit. Communities generally oppose the comprehensive
permit because through it, and with the support of the Housing Appeals
Committee, developers can request many waivers to local regulations. Also,
by consolidating all issues into one permit, many boards lose the power to
decide for themselves if a project meets their specific requirements for
approval. Developers are generally in favor of the comprehensive permit,
not only because by using it they can generally build at densities higher than
normally allowed, but also because it generally expedites getting approval.
It is interesting that the Massachusetts comprehensive permit was
narrowly defined--to be used only for affordable housing. The legislature
found that facilitating the construction of affordable housing was of statewide
concern, but the experience of San Jose and Houston suggests that facilitating
all permitting might lower the costs of all housing.24 This leads to a question
beyond the scope of this thesis: would towns object to having a
comprehensive permit process without the possibility of an override decision
by the Housing Appeals Committee?
The Massachusetts comprehensive permit process is explained in more
detail in Chapter 2.
24. See note 14.
CHAPTER 2 - THE MASSACHUSETTS COMPREHENSIVE PERMIT PROCESS
The Anti-Snob Zoning Act (MGL c. 40B §§ 20-23) was enacted to
promote the construction of low or moderate income (affordable) housing by:
(1) allowing a developer to apply for a single comprehensive permit from the
Zoning Board of Appeals in lieu of all other required local permits and to
request waivers of local requirements which would render the project
uneconomic, and (2) authorizing a developer to appeal to the Massachusetts
State Housing Appeals Committee any denial or uneconomic condition
attached to the approval of a comprehensive permit.
It is important to understand that these two factors work
simultaneously. That developers need to seek only one all-inclusive
approval and can appeal denials or conditions tht render the project
uneconomic, and understanding under what conditions the Housing Appeals
Committee favors developers, informs the Zoning Board of Appeals decision
whether to approve, approve with conditions, or deny a comprehensive
permit.
In this chapter, I describe the how developers seek approval through
the comprehensive permit process and the appeals process and then
summarize local experience and trends with comprehensive permits and
appeals to the HAC. 25
25. Information about the process of applying for a comprehensive permit
and appeals to the HAC was taken from: Massachusetts, State of,
Executive Office of Communities & Development. Guidelines for Local
Review of Comprehensive Permits. June 1990.
2.1 Comprehensive Permit Process
The comprehensive permit process really starts before the official
comprehensive permit application is submitted to the Zoning Board of
Appeals. Before a developer can even apply for a comprehensive permit, he
must get a project eligibility letter from a subsidizing agency which indicates
that the proposed project is eligible for funding under that subsidy program.
An eligibility letter does not indicate that funding has been approved, rather
that the project meets the requirements of the program and is eligible to apply
for funding. The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) issues the
site and project approval to developers seeking funding from a state or
private housing program. 26
The site approval process has many steps. Prior to submitting an
application for site and project approval with MHFA, developers must meet
with the local housing partnership and governing body of the community.
This ensures that MHFA is not the first to tell the community that an
affordable housing project has been proposed. It also demonstrates that the
developer has, at least, heard the community's feelings towards the proposal
and gives some credibility to the viability of the project before MHFA invest
time in reviewing it. MHFA first reviews the application to determine
general consistency with the guidelines of the specific program. If consistent,
MHFA solicits comments from the local Chief Elected Official. At this stage,
26. The Housing Division of the Executive Office of Communities and
Development (EOCD) issues eligibility letters for public housing. Federal
agencies issue eligibility letter for projects seeking funding under federal
programs. The Massachusetts Housing Partnership issues eligibility
letters for projects seeking technical assistance under the Local Initiative
Support Program.
communities often request comments from their Planning Board,
Conservation Commission, and local housing partnership. A formal public
hearing is not required at this time. During this phase, MHFA conducts its
own evaluation of the site, project, and design of the project. This includes a
visit to the project site and discussions with local officials to learn their
concerns with the development.
At the end of this period, an evaluation report is compiled and other
comments are collected from the qr rious groups identified above. Based on
these comments, a site letter is issued from MHFA that approves,
conditionally approves, or denies the application. If the developer receives
an approval or a conditional approval then he/she may submit an
application to the Zoning Board of Appeals for a comprehensive permit.27
A comprehensive permit application to the Zoning Board of Appeals
must include the letter stating that the project is eligible for funding,
preliminary drawings and plans showing the project and its context, and a list
of requested exemptions to local codes, ordinances, by-laws or regulations,
including the zoning and subdivisions by-laws. Developers may also request
that they be exempt from application fees. The application should also
include additional information which may be necessary for the Zoning Board
of Appeals to consider planning, health, and safety factors.
Upon receiving a comprehensive permit, the Zoning Board of Appeals
must send copies of the application to relevant local boards to solicit their
27. This outline of steps for receiving a site and project approval is given in
the MHFA Site Evaluation Application.
advice before and during the hearing process. Section 21 of MGL, Chapter 40B
states that "The Board of Appeals, in making its decision on said application,
shall take into consideration the recommendations of the local boards..." The
Conservation Commission and Board of Health have separate jurisdictions
and conduct separate hearings relating to state requirements in their areas.
The Zoning Board of Appeals may dispose of the application in one of
three manners. (1) approve the comprehensive permit on the terms and
conditions set forth in the application; (2) approve a comprehensive pern:u1 t
with conditions with respect to the site plan, height, size, shape, or building
materials that do not render the construction or operation of such housing
uneconomic; or (3) deny a comprehensive permit as not consistent with local
need. 28 The Board may also deny the comprehensive permit application to
protect health and safety, promote better site and building design, or preserve
open space.29
If a Zoning Board of Appeals denies a comprehensive permit or
approves the permit with conditions which the developer believes would
28. A site plan for affordable housing is consistent with local needs if less
than 10% of the community's existing housing stock is subsidized low or
middle income housing, if less than 1 1/2% of privately owned land
zoned for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes is used for
affordable housing, or if the proposed site plan would result in the
construction of low or middle income housing on not more than 0.3% of
total privately owned land or 10 acres in a single calendar year. (MGL c.
40B, § 20)
29. Several Housing Appeals Committee decisions have clearly established
that health or safety factors, or valid planning objections must outweigh
the regional and local needs for low and moderate income housing. For
a summary of these issues, see: Lacasse. The Anti-Snob Zoning Law: The
Effectiveness of Chapter 774 in Getting Affordable Housing Built.
make the project uneconomic, he may appeal the decision to the State
Housing Appeals Committee (HAC). The HAC, a five member adjudicatory
commission, has the power to override local zoning ordinances if the
affordable housing project is reasonable.
2.2 Housing Appeals Committee Process
Once a decicion is appealed, the HAC holds a pre-hearing conference of
counsel to solicit stipulations. At this conference, the HAC encourages the
parties to negotiate a settlement on their own. 30 If the parties choose not to
mediate, they bring their cases before the HAC and present expert testimony
on technical issues. Abutters can submit amicus briefs, but do not participate
directly in the hearing. The hearing provides a review of each party's last best
proposal.
Cases are ready for a decision approximately one year after the initial
filing with the HAC. Often the HAC takes another year to hand down its
ruling. Like a court of law, the HAC generally chooses one proposal; it does
not develop an intermediate proposal. In the spirit of the legislative intent of
Chapter 774, the HAC most often rules for the developer and allows the
affordable housing to be built. Recent statistics have shown that over 90
percent of the HAC decisions have been to overrule a Zoning Board of
Appeals' decision.
To facilitate parties settling disputes over affordable housing
themselves, HAC sponsors an affordable housing mediation program in
30. The Massachusetts State Office of Dispute Resolution operates an
affordable housing mediation program.
cooperation with the Office of Dispute Resolution. At the HAC's invitation, a
representative of the Office of Dispute Resolution attends the conference of
counsel--the first step in the hearing process--and describes the mediation
program and its advantages as an alternative to adjudication in the HAC.
The mediator's role is to assist the parties in fashioning a settlement.
The mediator does not impose a decision on the parties. The mediation
program does not prescribe steps for the mediator and parties to follow; the
process is informal. Usuply over a period of weeks, the parties meet jointly
and separately with the mediator to explore all possible avenues of
settlement. 31 Affordable Housing mediations generally take from one to
three months and involve approximately 12 joint meetings, private caucuses,
and telephone communications. 32
The Office of Dispute Resolution estimates that the total cost of
mediation does not exceed $10,000, divided equally among the parties.
Municipalities may seek up to $3000 worth of in-kind technical assistance
from the Massachusetts Housing Partnership Short Term Technical
Assistance Fund. This fund provides early technical assistance from pre-
qualified consultants to municipalities, local housing partnerships, and non-
profit corporations for the development of local projects and housing
initiatives.33
31. Office of Dispute Resolution, Affordable Housing Mediation Program
information sheet.
32. Resnick, Lauren J. "Mediating Affordable Housing Disputes in
Massachusetts: Optimal Intervention Points." Arbitration Journal, pg. 19.
33. It is unclear if MHP would approve an application for money without
the technical assistance. This fund was initiated in 1991, and to date, no
It is important to note that the state plays an important role in creating
incentives for developers to cooperate with town officials. In order to
facilitate the development of affordable housing, the state created the Local
Initiative Program which offers technical assistance to a city or town rather
than financial assistance to a developer. This technical assistance is the
"subsidy" required in order to apply for a comprehensive permit. Developers
of local initiative projects must have the written support of the chief elected
official and local housing partnership.34 This program gives towns resources
to work with developers without which there might be less incentive for
cooperation. Also, subsidies under the Homeownership Opportunity
Program (HOP) are limited to to developers who can demonstrate a high
level of cooperation with local government officials. 35
A recent trend in getting affordable housing built is the "friendly 774'."
This term is used to describe comprehensive permit applications where the
town initiates and facilitates the construction of an affordable housing
development. Generally, a town acquires land and then requests proposals
for building an affordable housing project. The selected developer works
with the town boards and Zoning Board of Appeals on designing the project
before applying for a comprehensive permit. Communities benefit because
they help design affordable housing projects which then count towards their
municipalities have requested funding under this program only to cover
their portion of the cost of mediation.
34. 760 CMR 45.00 Local Initiative Program
35. HOP is jointly administered by the Massachusetts Housing Partnership
and the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency. HOP combines low-
interest mortgage financing, state subsidies, and local contributions.
minimum requirements so that they do not face a HAC overrule if they deny
a comprehensive permit application.
2.3 Experience with Comprehensive Permits and Appeals to the HAC
Nearly every suburb in the Boston area has received applications for
comprehensive permits, and more than half of the communities in the
Commonwealth have some subsidized housing.36 Some 35,000 affordable
housing units have been proposed through comprehensive permits;
approximately 17,000 have been built.37
Trends shown in recent statistics for the total number and dispositions
of comprehensive permit applications are not surprising. 38 First, the total
number of applications has been increasing since Chapter 774's inception in
1969. Second, fewer applications are being denied, and third, more
applications are being approved with conditions rather than just approved.
Table 1 (at the end of this chapter) shows the total number and dispositions of
comprehensive permit applications. The parties interested in building
affordable housing are learning how to use Chapter 774 in their favor and
how Chapter 774 may work against them in a given situation. 39
36. Guzman,. Chapter 774: Anti-Snob Zoning Two Decades of Impact, Page
42-3.
37. Resnick. "Mediating Affordable Housing Disputes in Massachusetts:
Optimal Intervention Points." Arbitration Journal.
38. Many recent studies have been done to document the number and
disposition of comprehensive permit applications applied for each year
statewide and the number and disposition of appeals to the HAC.
However, each study differs and my attempts to update the information
using information from the HAC gives yet another set of numbers. The
numbers differ, but the trend remains the same.
39 Guzman. Chapter 774: Anti-Snob Zoning Two Decades of Impact.
The increase in the total number of comprehensive permit
applications through 1989 might be attributed to many factors such as
aggressive state funding and the creation of new housing programs. The
decrease in Zoning Boards of Appeals denying comprehensive permits over
time might be attributed to local officials learning that the HAC usually
decides in favor of the developer. 40 Table 2 (at the end of this chapter) shows
the dispositions of appeals to the HAC. Finally, the increase in the number of
conditioned approvals might be attributed to local officials learning that the
HAC will not overturn conditions unless the project is made uneconomic
due to the conditions. 41
2.4 Summary
The Massachusetts comprehensive permit is supposed to simplify the
development review process for affordable housing projects. Getting final
approval though is still a lengthy process because the pre-filing requirements
are lengthy. A developer must meet with town officials, seek site approval,
and assemble very detailed plans before he can apply for the comprehensive
permit. The pre-filing meetings with town officials are not unique to the
comprehensive permit, they serve the same purpose as voluntary pre-
application reviews, a step found in many communities' development
review procedures.
40. It would be interesting to study if in the future this percentage will
decline as parties learn more what marginal issues they have a chance at
successfully challenging or ZBAs find better ways to support denials. In
either case, the HAC may have less opportunity to favor the developer.
41. Guzman. Chapter 774: Anti-Snob Zoning Two Decades of Impact.
In general, there are two benefits to a pre-application review. First, it
gives the developer some knowledge of what the various boards' interests
and concerns are for that particular site and project. Second it reduces a
developer's uncertainty regarding whether the proposal will be approved or
denied--in theory, if a board helps design a proposal, then, feeling more
commitment to it, they will be less likely to deny it. The designers of the
Anti-Snob Zoning Act seemed to recognize the potential benefits of pre-
application review and chose to mandate it as a prerequisite for applying for a
comprehensive permit.
Finally, the word "comprehensive" suggests two ideas. First, that there
is a consideration of all pertinent issues, and second, that there is a better
understanding (comprehension) of the issues. Chapter 3 gives three case
studies from the Town of Yarmouth. For the comprehensive permit cases,
look for whether the Zoning Board of Appeals discussed all the issues and
whether there was really a better understanding of the issues. To what extent
did the Zoning Board of Appeals' hearing facilitate discussion and
understanding of the issues?
Table 1.1 - Comprehensive Permit Applications 1
Disposition
Granted
Conditioned
Denied
Other 2
1969-1978
17 15.3
38 34.2
47 42.4
9 8.1
1979-1986
129 66.8
11 6.0
49 27.2
1 0.0
1986-1989
89 47.7
39 20.8
39 20.8
20 10.7
Total 3 111 100.0 181 100.0 187 100.0 488 100.0
Notes:
1. Source: Guzman, Margaret. Chapter 774: Anti-Snob Zoning Two
Decades of Impact. Clark University Senior Thesis, April 1989. There
are not an equal number of years in each category because only
summary information is available. In 1978, 1986, and 1989, surveys
of comprehensive permits were done, but only summary statistics
were collected. These categories are ones that are used in the latest
(1989) update.
2. This category includes projects undecided at the local level or at
various stages of the appeals process.
3. The totals do not add up because of the disposition of the "other
projects." For example, the 1979-1986 column adds up to 190, but this
figure double counts the 9 "other" permits from the previous
column.
Table 1.2 - Average Number of Applications Per Year
Disposition
Granted
Conditioned
Denied
Other
1969-1978
ave. # of appl.
1.9
4.2
5.2
1.0
1979-1986
ave. # of appl.
18.4
1.6
7.0
0.14
1986-1989
ave. # of appl.
29.7
13.0
13.0
6.7
235
135
20(
Total
48.2
18.0
27.7
6.1
Table 2.1 - Appeals to the Housing Appeals Committee I
HAC Disposition
Overruled ZBA Decision
Sustained ZBA Decision
Settlement before Decision
Mandamus w/ Stipulations
Withdrawn
1969-1986
46 34.1
7 5.2
13 9.6
26 19.3
43 31.8
1986-1989
14 34.2
0 0.0
9 21.9
6 14.6
12 29.3
Total Appeals 2 135 100.0 96 100.0 231 100.0
Notes:
1. Source: Guzman, Margaret. Chapter 774: Anti-Snob Zoning Two
Decades of Impact. Clark University Senior Thesis, April 1989.
2. In 1989, at the time of the survey, only 41 appeals had been decided;
there were 55 active appeals at the HAC.
Table 2.2 - Average Number of Appeals Per Year
HAC Disposition
Overruled ZBA Decision
Sustained ZBA Decision
Settlement before Decision
Mandamus w/ Stipulations
Withdrawn
1969-1986 1986-1989
ave. # of appl. ave. # of appl.
2.7 4.7
0.4 0.0
0.8 3.0
1.5 2.0
2.5 4.0
Total
34.1
' 3.9
t 12.5
18.2
31.3
CHAPTER 3 - DEVELOPMENT PERMITTING CASES
This chapter summarizes three development permitting cases in the
Town of Yarmouth, Massachusetts: (1) Cummaquid Hills, a cluster of single
family homes, (2) Shorebrook Park, a multi-family condominium project,
and (3) German Hill, a single family home development. In the first case, the
developer followed the traditional subdivision and development review
process in Yarmouth. In the second case, the developer sought approval
through the Massachusetts comprehensive permit process, designing the
project and then applying for a comprehensive permit. The third case, also a
comprehensive permit project, was a "friendly 774." The developer was a
town agency (the Fair Housing Committee) and because a mediator was hired
to assist in building consensus among the town boards on the design of the
project before applying for a comprehensive permit.
3.1 Evaluation of Cases
When reading the three cases, note both the formal process for
reviewing development proposals and what additional (ad hoc) steps were
taken by the developers and town boards. In the Cummaquid Hills case, the
developer needed five approvals before he could apply for a construction
permit. In the comprehensive permit cases, the developers needed only one
approval. In all three cases, however, each developer consulted with the
town boards either prior to or during the formal review process. And in the
comprehensive permit cases, these ad hoc negotiations certainly helped shape
the final approval. In none of the cases did the actual process which the
developers went through follow only the formal approval process.
Proponents of comprehensive permitting argue that comprehensive
permitting both speeds up the decision-making process and improves the
quality of the proposed development because all the issues regarding its
benefits and impacts are considered at the same. To evaluate whether the
comprehensive permitting is faster, I looked at the potential amount of
duplication. Specifically, I considered:
(1) How many times the developer had to redesign the proposal once the
hearings started. redesigns are costly both financially and in the time
that they add to the process; therefore reducing the number of times
that a developer needs to redesign a proposal once in the hearing
process is desirable.
(2) Whether the developer was whipsawed--i.e., did the developer have to
address conflicting requirements. Similar to redesigns, developers
need to adjust their strategy for getting approval when faced with
conflicting requirements. Seeking re-approvals or additional waivers
as a result of conflicting standards is an often unanticipated step in the
process.
(3) How many separate hearings there were for the developer to attend. I
looked at whether the developers seemed to be making the same
presentation and arguments before each town board, whether some
issues were reviewed by multiple boards, and whether one board
considered the same issues multiple times. Each separate hearing is
time-consuming, the developer must submit an application, and then
allow time for the project to be reviewed by staff, and be scheduled on
the agenda.
I cannot evaluate the quality of the proposed development (it is
certainly subjective), but since proponents of comprehensive permitting
argue that comprehensive permitting improves the quality of the proposed
development because all the substantive issues are considered at the same, I
looked at what steps were taken to have all the issues considered at once:
(1) Whether the developer sought assistance from the various town boards
or the community in designing the project. This assistance not only
gives the developer some knowledge of what the various boards
interests and concerns are for that particular site and project, but also the
informal assistance is an opportunity for boards to offer suggestions
beyond their mandate--a more inclusive consideration of the proposal.
(2) Whether the developer explored many design options, or seemed to
settle on only one. It is unlikely that the first attempt to solve a problem
will be the best, however, by exploring many options the developer can
find new and perhaps better ways to meet everybody's interests.
(3) Whether there were integrative solutions developed to resolve issues.
Integrative solutions, where the interests of many boards are met,
demonstrates that the issues were considered comprehensively.
3.2 Cummaquid Hills 42
In March, 1988, the Cummaquid Hills Realty Trust (developer)
submitted a preliminary subdivision plan for a single family residential
cluster on 15.5 acres in the Town of Yarmouth. The cluster was a portion of a
42. Information about this case was gathered from project files from various
agencies, from personal interviews with David Kellogg, Town Planner
(April 9, 1992), and Bill Wood, Chair of the Fair Housing Committee
(April 9, 1992).
larger proposal, most of which was located in the adjoining Town of
Barnstable; the Town of Yarmouth was concerned only with the cluster
portion of the entire proposal as only this portion was in Yarmouth. The
proposal showed 13 reduced-size lots (less than 40,000 square feet) clustered
on approximately one-third of the site with the remaining area dedicated as
open space. According to the Yarmouth Subdivision By-Law, the developer
needed to receive six separate approvals before he could apply to the Building
Inspector for construction permits:
(1) approval from the Planning Board for the preliminary subdivision
plan;
(2) approval from the Site Plan Review Team for internal site planning
issues;
(3) special permit from the Zoning Board of Appeals for the cluster
concept and regional planning issues;
(4) approval from the Board of Health for wetland protection and nitrate
loading standards;
(5) approval from the Conservation Commission on the amount and
management of open space; and,
(6) final approval by the Planning Board for the final subdivision plan.
As in many communities, the Town of Yarmouth encourages
developers to consult with the Planning Board and Town Planner for an
informal review of their proposal. This pre-application review, according to
the Subdivision By-Law, is an opportunity to exchange information; a public
hearing is not required and minutes of the discussion are not kept. The
developer of Cummaquid Hills opted to attend the pre-application review
and met with the Planning Board and Town Planner to ask questions about
what boards and agencies might have jurisdiction and what regulations (such
as lot size, frontage, setbacks, etc) might apply to him. He also brought a
concept plan for the Planning Board and Town Planner to review showing
13-15 lots clustered on approximately 5 acres with the remaining 10 acres
dedicated to the city for open space and passive recreation. The two major
issues were the reduced lot size allowed by the the cluster concept (smaller
than the R-40 zone--residential-40,000 sq. ft. lots--allowed), and special setback
requirements because the property bordered a pond.
The preliminary subdivision plan submitted to the Planning Board for
approval showed 13 lots clustered on approximately five acres--much the
same as the concept plan. At a public hearing in March 1988, the Planning
Board approved the preliminary plan on the condition that the special permit
for the cluster division be approved by the Zoning Board of Appeals. No
objectors showed up to this hearing (perhaps because the site is remote). In
approving the preliminary plan, the Planning Board expressed concern that
one lot (lot 13) did not meet frontage requirements on the proposed street,
nor building and septic system setback requirements from the pond.
Although they did not require that lot 13 be eliminated, they stated that
eliminating it would not cause economic hardship to the developer.
The Planning Board does not decide on cluster divisions but must
approve the preliminary plan before it can be heard by the Zoning Board of
Appeals. That a developer must get a special permit for the cluster concept
from the Zoning Board of Appeals instead of the Planning Board seems to
invite whipsawing. The Zoning Board of Appeals generally approves
variances and special permits for uses not allowed as-of-right, and since
Yarmouth wanted cluster divisions to be reviewed as a special use, giving the
power of approval to the Zoning Board of Appeals was logical. In the case of
cluster developments, however, the cluster concept is more like a subdivision
which must be approved by the Planning Board. Therefore it might have
made more sense for the Planning Board to review cluster developments
too.43
Before the Zoning Board of Appeals holds a public hearing for the
special permit to approve the cluster division, the developer must receive site
plan approval from the Site Plan Review Team. Site plan review is done to
ensure that the proposal is consistent with on-site planning issues: internal
circulation and egress from the site, building location, access by fire and
service equipment, utilities and drainage, environmental impacts, and
compliance with the character of the neighborhood. The Site Plan Review
Team is made up of the Building Inspector, Town Planner, Water
Superintendent, and Health Agent and may include the Fire Chief, Town
Engineer and a representative of the Conservation Commission. This team
looks at issues in a multi-disciplinary approach. While they might fit the
"multi-agency" model of joint hearings, they have only a narrow mandate--to
consider on-site issues.
Site plan review is generally informal; the Site Plan Review Team
meets with the developer to discuss its concerns. The developer presents the
project, listens to the concerns of the individuals on the review team, and
43. At the 1992 Yarmouth Town Meeting, an amendment to the
Subdivision By-Law transferring the power of approval for cluster
divisions from the Zoning Board of Appeals back to the Planning Board
of Appeals will be considered. The ZBA is not expected to oppose this.
answers questions. A public hearing is not held and minutes are not kept,
although the site plan approval contains statements of interest and concern
by individuals of the review team. The Site Plan Review Team cannot bind
the developer. Individual boards, however, may enforce the interests and
concerns of the Site Plan Review Team.
In May, the Site Plan Review Team identified a number of issues. The
Planning Board's concerns about the preliminary plan were re-expressed.
The Town Engineer questioned thp amount of developable land because the
land was largely classified as "severe," and must pass deep hole and
percolation tests before being declared suitable for septic systems. The Board
of Health required that a public hearing be held in conjunction with their
nitrate loading regulations, and expressed concern that lot 13 might not meet
septic system setback requirements from the pond. The Fire Chief expressed
concern about the driveway layouts shown on two other lots (23 and 24). He
also asked that wider driveways be built for fire and rescue vehicles on lots 13,
23 and 24, that fire hydrants be installed, and that "adequate" house
numbering be provided. The Conservation Commission asked that the plan
show how the open space was to be managed. Finally, as a group, the Site
Plan Review Team urged" that cumulative impacts of this and potential
future development be considered at the time of approval, and that the
Zoning Board of Appeals consider a conventional layout plan--as none had
been prepared to date.
In preparation for the Zoning Board of Appeals' hearing, the developer
answered many of the Site Plan Review Team's questions. The developer's
attorney proposed that the open space be "conveyed to an entity comprised of
lot owners within the development." The Town of Yarmouth would be
granted an easement to use the open space for passive recreation only and be
responsible for enforcing the restrictions. A traffic study was conducted,
showing that at peak rush hour, less than one car per minute on average
would enter or exit the site. And, anticipating needing the information for
both the Zoning Board of Appeals and the Board of Health hearings, the
developer hired an outside engineer to conduct the deep hole and percolation
tests. The tests indicated that the soil was suitable for septic systems and that
the septic system setback requirement for lot 13 could be reduced. The
developer did not eliminate lot 13 as requested by the Planning Board, nor
increase driveway widths as requested by the Fire Chief.
The Zoning Board of Appeals, to approve a cluster development, must
make a number of findings (1) that the proposed subdivision plan allows
relatively intensive use of land while not increasing the population density
on a large scale; (2) that the plan preserves open space for conservation and
passive recreation; (3) that the plan introduces variety and choice into
residential development; (4) that the plan contributes to meeting housing
needs; and, (5) that the plan facilitates economical and efficient provision of
public services. In addition, the Zoning Board of Appeals must find that
undue nuisance, hazard, or congestion will not be created by the project, and
that there will be no harm to the established or future character of the
neighborhood or town.
The developer made an application to the Zoning Board of Appeals
requesting two approvals: a special permit for the cluster concept, and a
variance for the building and septic system setback requirements on lot 13 and
driveway widths on lots 13, 23 and 24.44 The Zoning Board of Appeals sent
copies of the special permit application and proposal to the members of the
site review team for comments. Only the Planning Board responded, urging
the Zoning Board of Appeals to approve the cluster, but eliminate lot 13 and
require that lots 23 and 24 share a common driveway.
The Zoning Board of Appeals granted the special permit for the cluster
development but required that lots 23 and 24 share a common driveway as
requested by the Fire Chief and urged by the Planning Board. Included in the
special permit was an allowance for a narrow driveway, and reduced building
and septic system setbacks for lot 13.45 The Board of Health would have the
final say on whether the soil was suitable for the proposed septic systems and
whether to allow the reduced septic system setback for lot 13. The Zoning
Board of Appeals also required that the developer withdraw the request for a
variance as those issues were allowed in the special permit.
The Zoning Board of Appeals also seemed to disregard the Site Plan
Review Team's request to consider the cumulative impacts of the project
along with potential future development even though a currently
undeveloped parcel adjacent to the developed portion of the proposed cluster
had a potential for 12 or 13 additional lots. The Zoning Board of Appeals
simply stated that because egress into Cummaquid Hills would be through
44. Perhaps the developer's reason for applying for a variance at the same
time was because of uncertainty of the extent of Zoning Board of
Appeals' action on the special permit application.
45. The developer was also asked to withdraw the request for the variance,
which he did because the Zoning Board of Appeals approved the special
permit without needing a variance.
the Town of Barnstable, cumulative impacts were not an issue. Nor did the
Zoning Board of Appeals consider a conventional layout plan. This was not
part of their required review.
The Board of Health hearing was held after the Zoning Board of
Appeals hearing--their approval was not necessary for the Zoning Board of
Appeals to issue a special permit. The Board of Health found that the soil on
the cluster site was suitable for the proposed septic systems and approved the
reduced building setback on lot 13 and the use of the septic system if it were
located along the westerly side of the lot, farthest away from the pond.
The Planning Board approved the final subdivision plan--the same
plan which the Zoning Board of Appeals approved--and the final plan was
filed with the City Clerk's office on July 19, 1988. The project has been
completed and is fully occupied.
Analysis
The developer needed a total of six separate approvals from the
Planning Board (twice), Site Plan Review Team, Zoning Board of Appeals,
Board of Health, and Conservation Commission. And for each, the
developer had to file separate applications, wait to be scheduled on the
agenda, attend the hearings, and wait for a decision. The whole process of
getting approval from applying for a preliminary plan approval to filing the
final map with the City Clerk took six months. In this case, the developer did
not have to make major revisions to the design of the project after submitting
the application, although the possibility certainly existed. Many of the issues
mentioned by the Site Plan Review Team could have led to major changes in
the design of the project. Such changes would have been required had the
project site not passed the deep hole and percolation tests, had the Board of
Health found that lot 13 was not buildable, or had the Zoning Board of
Appeals required the developer to consider a conventional layout. Neither
did the developer seem to be whipsawed, but again, the potential certainly
existed because he needed approvals from both the Zoning Board of Appeals
and the Board of Health concerning the proposed reduced septic system
setback on lot 13.
The developer did not seek any assistance of the town boards in
designing the project after the pre-application review. The proposal at the
pre-application review before the Planning Board showed 13-15 lots. The
preliminary plan showed 13 lots and this plan was virtually unchanged
throughout the entire hearings process. That there was little contact with the
town boards and that the pre-application plan and approved preliminary plan
were similar, indicates that the developer may not have explored many ways
of meeting the individual interests and requirements before committing to
the 13-lot configuration. Perhaps though, many possibilities were considered
before the concept plan was developed. It is interesting to note that the town
boards went beyond the'i narrow mandate to look inclusively at the issues.
They could not require changes (nor commit other boards to integrative
solutions) in response to concerns which went beyond their mandate. The
Site Plan Review Team was mandated to approve the proposal on internal
(on-site) considerations only, but they also considered off-site nitrate-loading,
areawide traffic, and community use of open space. The Zoning Board of
Appeals was only mandated to give approval on communitywide (off-site)
planning issues, but they considered the setbacks and driveway width for lot
13 too. Where the "official" process envisioned substantive issues being
considered separately, the town boards supplemented the process with their
own inclusive reviews.
3.3 Shorebrook Park46
In August 1987, Shorebrook Trust (developer) applied to the Yarmouth
Zoning Board of Appeals for a comprehensive permit to construct a 64 unit
multi-family condominium cluster development on a 3.2 acre site. Funding
subsidies for the project were to be through the Massachusetts
Homeownership Opportunity Program (HOP). The Zoning Board of Appeals
denied the comprehensive permit; the developer appealed the decision to the
Massachusetts Housing Appeals Committee (HAC) who overturned the
denial; and finally, the Zoning Board of Appeals appealed the HAC decision
to the State Supreme Judicial Court who upheld the HAC decision. Soon
after this decision, though the developer abandoned the project for lack of
funding to remove toxins from the site. The project site is the former site of
the Yarmouth solid waste landfill, and then after the landfill closed, it was
used as an oil storage facility.
In November, 1986, before making application to MHFA, the developer
met with the Board of Selectmen to discuss his proposal. 47 At that meeting,
the Board of Selectmen endorsed the concept of affordable housing, but stated
46. Information about this case was gathered from project files from various
agencies, and from personal interviews with David Kellogg, Town
Planner (April 9, 1992) and Bill Wood, Chair of the Fair Housing
Committee (April 9, 1992).
47. Although required by the MHFA application, the developer did not meet
with the Yarmouth Fair Housing Committee until after the Zoning
Board of Appeals opened the public hearing.
that 64 units on the site exceeded a reasonable density in the Town of
Yarmouth. As a result of that meeting, the Board of Selectmen directed the
town planner to quickly develop guidelines to adopt concerning density,
percentage of affordable units, and other issues which would generate a point
score for affordable housing and comprehensive permit projects. The town
planner did this (without public participation) and the Board of Selectmen
adopted a guideline of eight units per acre for affordable housing and
comprehensive permit projects. This quick response was perhaps because the
Board of Selectmen wanted to establish a position on what are planning,
health, and safety criteria in case they ever needed to defend a decision
denying a comprehensive permit before the HAC.
The developer went ahead with his 64 unit concept and applied to the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA). MHFA approved the 64
unit concept, finding that the site was appropriate for housing (despite the
hazardous waste) and that the 64 unit project was feasible and consistent with
the HOP guidelines. Half of the units would be affordable and the other half
would be market-rate units. Prior to submitting the site approval application,
and perhaps intending to re-assure MHFA that the site could be cleaned, the
developer removed an unspecified number of old oil storage tanks and
agreed to remove additional contaminated materials and soil as needed. 48
48. As an aside, at the time of the purchase, it appears that neither the
developer, nor the bank was aware of what the site was previously used
for. The developer paid top dollar for the site ($180,000 in 1986) and after
the developer went bankrupt (after abandoning the project), the bank
took ownership. Since then, the bank has tried numerous times to give
the site back to the city, but the city does not want responsibility for it.
The property currently sits as open space and this is acceptable to the city
until a developer purchases it and cleans it up.
After receiving site approval, the developer began work on the
comprehensive permit application. Town staff do not recall, and nor do the
project files show evidence that the developer consulted with the town while
preparing the application. In December, 1987, the developer formally applied
to the Zoning Board of Appeals for a comprehensive permit. The application
for 64 units included the preliminary site development plan, construction
drawings (landscape plan and plan and elevation views of the model units),
preliminary utilities plan, and a list of requested exceptions to local codes.
As required by law, the Zoning Board of Appeals forwarded copies of
the application to the various town boards and departments: Planning Board,
Board of Health, Fire Department, Water Department, Engineering
Department, Site Plan Review Team members, Building Inspector, School
Board and Conservation Commission. Each board returned comments and a
recommendation that the application be denied for various substantive
reasons.
The Planning Board was concerned that the site was not suitable for
affordable housing because of "unsuitable materials" on the site itself and
because of its adjacency to the Town's Highway Department and Town-
owned site which was proposed to be used as the town's composting pit. In
addition, the Planning Board expressed concern that the proposed density (21
units per acre) did not meet the Board of Selectmen's guidelines. The Board
of Health and Water Department both claimed that a wastewater treatment
facility would be needed after projecting that the development would produce
a nitrate load of nearly 100 part per million (well over the allowed 5 ppm).
The Fire Department indicated that sprinklers, not shown in the proposed
units, would be necessary. The Engineering Department and Site Plan
Review Team expressed concern over the traffic impacts of the project. The
developer's traffic impact study concluded that no appreciable impacts would
be generated by the project; however, the Engineering Department and Site
Plan Review Team provided evidence that the traffic would exacerbate an
already dangerous intersection. In addition, there were a number of already
approved, but still unbuilt projects in the same vicinity; cumulatively, the
impacts would be significant. The School Board was concerned that many of
the 208 projected residents would be of school age and that there would be a
major impact on the school bus system and classroom space. The
Conservation Commission rejected that developer's proposal that abutting
open space would satisfy their open space requirement. Finally, the Board of
Selectmen urged that their adopted standard of eight units per acre be
enforced.
The Zoning Board of Appeals opened the public hearing in January,
1988 and continued it for three additional meeting nights. The four nights
spanned a total of two months. The developer was represented by his
attorney and had his architect appear as an expert witness. In the course of
the hearings, numerous questions were posed to the developer's
representatives by members of the Zoning Board of Appeals and other town
boards. Representatives from town boards also spoke opposing the
development, and through the Zoning Board of Appeals, requested further
information and documentation from the developer. On the first night,
January 27, 1988, the developer's representatives presented the proposal and
called numerous witnesses to speak in favor of the project. After many
hours, but with still further testimony in support of the proposal to be heard,
the hearing was continued until February 12.
On February 6, before the continued hearing reconvened, the executive
secretary to the Board of Selectmen attended a workshop on comprehensive
permits sponsored by a group of planning consultants and state officials in
Holyoke, MA. 4 9 On February 9, the executive secretary suggested to the
Zoning Board of Appeals that they apply to the Massachusetts Housing
Partnership (MHP) for financial assistance to hire a technical advisor to help
them review and understand the technical complexities of the proposal, and
negotiate and seek concessions from the developer. With a $7500 grant from
MT-IP, the Zoning Board of Appeals hired I.E.P., Inc.so The executive secretary
also suggested that the Zoning Board of Appeals negotiate with the developer.
"All of the speakers [at the workshop] emphasized that the Board of Appeals
can, and should, negotiate with applicants for comprehensive permits. They
all viewed the comprehensive permit as an opportunity for the town to
receive some benefit from a developer in exchange for the loosening of
zoning restrictions."51
49. It is unclear whether the executive secretary attended the conference in
response to the Shorebrook Park application, or whether the timing was
merely coincidental.
50. MHP operated a Municipal Assistance Program which made funds
available to municipalities to hire technical experts to assist them in
reviewing comprehensive permit applications. A similar program, the
Short-Term Technical Assistance Program exists today in place of the
MAP.
51. Memorandum from executive secretary to the Zoning Board of Appeals,
2/9/88 (Exhibit HH in the ZBA hearing packet).
The Board of Selectmen suggested a "list of conditions that the Zoning
Board of Appeals should set in exchange for loosening the zoning
requirements:" (1) mandating sprinklers in each unit, (2) completing a school
impact study, (3) contributing towards the construction cost of the proposed
abutting composting pit, (4) improving an off-site recreation area, (5)
improving the septage treatment facility at the new town landfill, and (6)
limiting the project to eight units per acre. The Board of Selectmen seemed to
misunderstand the concept of seeking concessions from the developer. The
workshop emphasized that through negotiation, the Zoning Board of
Appeals can ask for concessions from the developer, and the developer can
choose whether or not to agree to provide additional studies and even
unrelated mitigation. With a comprehensive permit, a developer is entitled
to override zoning requirements so long as planning, health and safety issues
are still met. The Board of Selectmen seemed to take the concept as an
opportunity to apply conditions to the comprehensive permit--that granting
waivers and issuing a comprehensive permit was itself a concession, and not
an entitlement from the town. The Board of Selectmen saw the role of the
technical advisor as helping them get their requested conditions.
At the February 12 meeting, at the request of the Board of Selectmen
and after more testimony from proponents of the project, the Zoning Board
of Appeals continued the hearing again to March 9 to allow time for I.E.P. to
complete their review of the developer's application and supporting
information, meet with the developer and his representatives, and provide
their assessment of the project.
On March 9, the developer's representatives informed the Zoning
Board of Appeals that they met with I.E.P. and had agreed to reduce the
overall number of units from 64 down to 52. The developer's representatives
also responded to many of the questions and information requests that had
yet gone unanswered from previous nights. Then, after further questioning
by the Board, the developer's representatives suggested that the Zoning Board
of Appeals appoint a subcommittee consisting of two members of the Board
to meet, negotiate, and attempt to formulate a recommendation to the full
Board upon which a decision could be based. The hearing was continued
again until March 31.
The subcommittee met three times with the developer and his
representatives during the next three weeks. These meetings were also
attended by a committee of representatives from the Board of Selectmen, the
Board of Health, Fire Department, Planning Board, and others. The
developer's attorney took on a mediator's role, getting issues and concerns
out into the open anca suggesting possible concessions. Discussions focused
mostly on economic limitations within which the developer was working
rather than solutions to the various interests and concerns. The developer
agreed to reduce the number of units again, down to 47--less than I.E.P.'s
recommendation of 52. No agreement was reached on the design of the
project or on any of the Board of Selectmen's proposed conditions. Both the
Massachusetts Housing Partnership and the Massachusetts Housing Finance
Authority approved the reduction.
On March 31, at the continued hearing, the subcommittee reported to
the full Board that they had a new understanding of the economic
considerations within which the developer was working. Additional
questions followed this presentation and then the Zoning Board of Appeals
ended the public hearing.
After this meeting, the Board of Selectmen voted to endorse the
project, but with a maximum density of 8 units per acre. This seems to have
been a political move by the Board of Selectmen. In the formal
comprehensive permit process, they are bystanders--they cannot approve nor
deny the project. Perhaps the Board of Selectmen saw their votes as an
opportunity to demonstrate a commitment to building affordable housing
(this was one of the first comprehensive permits in Yarmouth) and as a way
to bring pressure to bear on the Zoning Board of Appeals to take seriously
their guideines for affordable housing and comprehensive permit projects. 52
On April 15, 1988, the Zoning Board of Appeals debated the project and,
in a four to one vote, approved the comprehensive permit with a maximum
of 25 units, even though I.E.P. stated that 52 units were needed to make the
project economically feasible and the developer had already agreed to only 47
units. The developer was directed to re-submit a new proposal for approval
showing a maximum of 25 units, and that when redesigning the project, the
new plans should be consistent with the type of design, layout, and
construction as was originally proposed. In its decision, the Zoning Board of
52. The five members of the Yarmouth Zoning Board of Appeals are
appointed by the Board of Selectmen; they serve for five years and have
their terms staggered by one year. Interviews for new members are held
each year and members up for reappointment must be re-interviewed.
The nine alternate members are also appointed and serve one year
terms.
Appeals stated that it applied the guidelines and criteria of the Yarmouth
Development Guidelines and Project Evaluation Criteria for Affordable
Housing Projects, the document prepared by the town planner in 1986 at the
directive of the Board of Selectmen.
The developer appealed the decision to the Housing Appeals
Committee, arguing that the reduced density condition rendered the project
economically unfeasible. On May 3, 1989, approximately one year after the
appeal was filed, the HAC overturned the Yarmouth Zoning Board of
Appeals decision, and approved the 47 units agreed upon by the developer in
negotiations with the Zoning Board of Appeals subcommittee. This decision
was later upheld by the Massachusetts State Judicial Supreme Court following
an appeal by the Yarmouth Zoning Board of Appeals.
The Shorebrook Park project was never constructed. The costs of
cleaning the site were prohibitive and soon after the Supreme Judicial Court
decision, the developer went bankrupt. It is unclear why the developer
abandoned the project. One explanation might be that the prices for the
market-rate units went down with the economy and that the smaller profits
from the market-rate units could no longer offset the cost of the affordable
units. Perhaps the money set aside to clean the site was used up in the
appeals process--simply getting approval for the project. Perhaps there were
more toxins on the site than originally believed; only 47 units would not
cover the costs of the additional clean-up and the developer may not have
wanted to try to amend the permit.
Analysis
The Shorebrook Park developer attended only one public hearing, but
it was continued for four separate nights spanning two months. In a sense,
duplication was eliminated; the developer filed only one application and
presented the project only once. But consider the number of times the
proposal was reshaped during those two months. In response to I.E.P.'s
analysis, the developer offered to reduce the proposal from 64 down to 52
units, and then, during the subcommittee negotiations, down to 47 units.
There was little contact between the developer and town boards after
the initial discussion with the Board of Selectmen. Nor did it appear that the
developer explored many ways to meet the interests of the town boards before
making the application. This exploration was the intent of the subcommittee.
The subcommittee, however, seemed to focus on how to reduce the total
number of units given the developer's economic limitations; there were no
integrative solutions, only compromises. Also, the comprehensive permit
process did not eliminate the developer's need to redesign the project. As a
condition of the approval from the Zoning Board of Appeals and the Housing
Appeals Committee, the developer had to redesign the project.
3.4 German Hill 5 3
In April, 1989, the German Hill Estates Associates applied to the
Yarmouth Zoning Board of Appeals for a comprehensive permit to construct
37 single family units under the Homeownership Opportunity Program
53. Information about this case was gathered from project files from various
agencies, from phone interviews with Noah Dorius, consultant to the
Yarmouth Fair Housing Committee (March, 18, 1992), and personal
interviews with David Kellogg, Town Planner (April 9, 1992), and Bill
Wood, Chair of the Fair Housing Committee (April 9, 1992).
(HOP) on a 10.9 acres site. In January, 1987, at a Town Meeting, the Yarmouth
Fair Housing Committee was authorized to create the German Hill Estates
Associates, a limited dividend organization and acquire a lease on the
German Hill site (by eminent domain) specifically to construct an affordable
housing project. In December, 1987, the acquisition was finalized. The
Yarmouth Fair Housing Committee was the applicant for the project, but they
needed a contractor who would work within the Committee's concept for the
site.
Soon after the German Hill Estates Associates was established in early
1987, the Fair Housing Committee issued a request for proposals (RFP) to
construct approximately 40 units on the site. Proposals would be evaluated
based on specific building standards and criteria and were required to have
many of the same elements as a comprehensive permit application. The
proposal, however, would not be accepted as the comprehensive permit
application; the chosen contractor was expected to work with the Fair
Housing Committee in putting together the final application. In addition, the
RFP required that proposals include building a one-quarter mile access road to
the site. This made any proposal economically infeasible if the contractor
were to stay within HOP home price guidelines. Only one proposal was
received and it did not include building the access road. None of the
proposals were accepted and the Fair Housing Committee wanted to revise
and re-issue the RFP.
In October 1987, to assist in revising the proposal, selecting a contractor,
and getting final approval, the Fair Housing Committee hired Noah Dorius, a
planning consultant, using the Massachusetts Municipal Assistance Program
(administered by the Massachusetts Housing Partnership). 54 The second RFP
consisted included guidelines reflecting Yarmouth's goals regarding
affordable housing and only a very few general standards and criteria for
reviewing the proposals. Proposals were judged on the contractor's
credentials, the quality of their work, and the potential for a good working
relationship with the town. 55 The intention was to make the proposals open
to more input from the potential contractors themselves. A pre-bid
conference was even held for contractors who were considering whether or
not to submit a proposal. This time, six proposals were received, and in early
1988, the Fair Housing Committee chose Dacey Construction as the contractor.
During the next several months, Dorius assisted the Fair Housing Committee
ard Dacey in preparing the comprehensive permit application by arranging
and facilitating discussions with various town boards and suggesting possible
ways of meeting the various interests.
When the Fair Housing Committee, Dacey, and the various town
boards met to discuss the proposal, Dorius emphasized that discussions
should focus on their interests and concerns, that judgment of the
permissibility of the project overall should be deferred, and that they ought to
explore many possible options. Initially, Dorius suggested that the Fair
Housing Committee, Dacey, and the town boards refrain from committing
early to any single proposal; however, as ideas were introduced and refined,
Dorius encouraged them to work from one single document, rather than
trying to piece together elements of many different possible options.
54. This program no longer exists. The early technical assistance program is
its successor, but it gives much less financial assistance.
5s. In order to receive HOP subsidies, a developer needs to prove that there
is a good working relationship with the town.
According to Dorius and Bill Wood, Chair of the Yarmouth Fair Housing
Committee, communications were frequent and information was exchanged
freely.
This pre-filing consultation is similar in purpose to the voluntary pre-
application review suggested in the Zoning Ordinance. In both cases,
developers aim to have their proposals endorsed by the various town boards
before the formal hearings. Comprehensive permitting, however, differs
from the traditional development review process because there are fewer
hearings after a consensus is reached. There is less opportunity for town
boards to affect the final approval if they renege on their endorsement after
the application is submitted.
The town boards who worked with Dacey and the Fair Housing
Committee were: the Planning Board, Site Plan Review Team, Board of
Health, Conservation Commission, Engineering Department, Water
Department, Fire Department, and School Board. In addition, the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, Massachusetts Housing Partnership
and the Old King's Highway Regional Historic Commission were consulted.
The major issues were how to finance the access road to and from the site and
proximity of the access road to a designated wetland, nitrate loading, and
architectural design of the units
The Planning Board, Site Plan Review Team, Engineering Department,
and Board of Selectmen requested that Dacey construct an access road onto the
site and improve and widen the existing connecting road. Dacey, speaking
through the Fair Housing Committee, argued that requiring these before the
town would issue certificates of occupancy would make the project
economically infeasible; he could not afford to build the road first. They
explored many options including the town providing materials, labor, or
other resources. The final agreement, formed in part from a suggestion made
by Dorius, was that the town would issue certificates of occupancy for half of
the units when only the base layer of asphalt was down on all the roadways.
The remaining certificates of occupancy would be issued after all the roads
were completed. Phasing the road construction costs made the project
economically feasible, and the Fire Department was satisfied that safety would
not be compromised before the roads were completed.
The access road was designed to run through an area which is
occasionally flooded. The Fair Housing Committee and Engineering
Department argued that the area was not a wetland because the flooding was
artificially created--caused by runoff from Route 6 nearby--and that in
constructing the road, they could just relocate the flooding. The
Conservation Commission, however, required that the road be re-designed
around the wetland--24 feet from the original alignment. Recall that the
Conservation Commission must approve the project separately from the
comprehensive permit. In order to get the Conservation Commission to
endorse the proposal, the Fair Housing Committee agreed to move the road.
The re-aligned road would not cost more than the originally proposed road
for the contractor to build, and because this issue was being addressed in the
preliminary design of the road, the additional cost to the town Engineering
Department for redesign would be minimal.
The third major issue was nitrate-loading. The German Hill site is
within a zone of contribution for public water supply. The Board of Health
and Water Department found that the density of the project (even at only 3.39
units per acre) would cause the Board of Health's nitrate loading standards to
be exceeded. The project was projected to produce a nitrate load of 18.3 parts
per million where the standards only allowed 5 ppm. Discussions about this
issue focused on whether to waive the nitrate-loading standard or annex
abutting land to the project. The Board of Selectmen, however, agreed to
allow approximately 30 acres of abutting town-owned open space to be
considered part of the development only for calculating nitrate loads. With
the additional 30 acres included in the calculations, the resulting total nitrate
load was only 4.9 ppm. It is interesting that the Town allowed using the
abutting 30 acres in calculating nitrate loading for this project, but rejected a
similar proposal for the Shorebrook Park development.
The other major issue was the architectural detail of the units. This
was a contentious issue because German Hill is located in the jurisdiction of
the Old King's Highway Regional Historic Commission. This Commission is
responsible for ensuring that architectural features of buildings are consistent
with "Cape Cod character," and must approve building design before a
building permit can be issued. Of particular concern was the setback of second
stories on the units. To date, the Commission had always allowed the second
story to be flush with the first story so long as there was an eave to separate
the two stories. For the German Hill project, however, the Commission
insisted that second stories be set four feet back from the first story. This
requirement increased the cost of the units because the second story could not
be build directly on top of the load bearing walls on the first story. Additional
foundation and construction work and building materials were needed to
support the second story. Dorius suggested that a common way to cut
construction costs is to leave the second story of some of the units unfinished.
This option was approved by the Building Inspector, and in the end,
approximately half of the units had only rough construction completed on
the second floor.
In November, 1988, when all the issues were resolved, and it appeared
that all the town boards were satisfied with the proposal, the Fair Housing
Committee sent a memorandum of understanding documenting opinions
and agreements reached to the town boards who had an interest in the
project. No changes in the proposal were made, and the Fair Housing
Committee and Dacey applied to the Massachusetts Housing Finance
Authority (MHFA) for site approval.
In March 1989, MHFA, finding that the memorandum of
understanding demonstrated a high level of developer-community
cooperation to merit the use of HOP funds and that the proposal was within
HOP guidelines, gave its site approval. In April, the Fair Housing Committee
and Dacey completed and submitted the comprehensive permit application.
The memorandum of understanding was included in the application in
hopes that it would create an agenda for discussion at the comprehensive
permit hearing. By the time the comprehensive permit application was
submitted, the Zoning Board of Appeals and all other town boards, having
seen the project evolve, supported the concept of affordable housing and
actual design; there were no surprises at the hearing.
At the Zoning Board of Appeals hearing on May 24, Dacey presented
the proposal, the Fair Housing Committee and Town Planner spoke as
advocates for the proposal, and letters of support from all the town boards
were read. The Board asked Dacey to clarify many issues and for more
information regarding engineering standards for the intersection at the
beginning of the access road. The hearing was continued for one week,
during which time Dacey's engineer and the town engineer developed a joint
response. Also, responding to another comment made at the hearing, Dacey
filed a request with the Massachusetts Department of Transportation to cut
back a fence which impaired fire access views into the site. On May 30, the
hearing was re-convened and after a short question and answer period, the
Zoning Board of Appeals voted unanimously to approve the comprehensive
permit. In its decision, the Zoning Board of Appeals noted the "strong
support" by the Yarmouth Board of Selectmen.
After the decision, however, the Massachusetts Housing Partnership
informed the Fair Housing Committee that the state did not allow a ground
lease from the Town to the developer. In December 1989, the Town of
Yarmouth, at a special town meeting, voted by more than two-thirds to deed
the German Hill site over to the German Hill Estates Associates. Such a high
percentage of approval at the town meeting demonstrated the community's
support for the project too. A hearing to amend the comprehensive permit
was scheduled for two days after the town meeting and in another
unanimous decision, the Zoning Board of Appeals allowed for a ground lease
or sale from the Town to the Fair Housing Committee and then to the home
purchasers. It is interesting that the Zoning Board of Appeals could have
required other concessions from the developer (having so much already
invested in the project at a late stage) at the second hearing, but chose to only
amend the permit as requested.
The entire process from the issuance of the second RFP to
groundbreaking was approximately two years. The project is now complete
and is at full occupancy.
Analysis
The German Hill case demonstrates that getting approval need not be a
long, difficult process. By using the town boards to help design the proposal,
the Fair Housing Committee and Dacey were able to address nearly all the
various concerns and interests. Only minor engineering and fire access issues
prevented the decision from being made 'n one night. While the plan did
not have to be redesigned after the hearing process had been initiated, there
were extensive reshaping in the pre-filing stage. The Fair Housing
Committee explored many options with the town boards and after the Fair
Housing Committee had gathered information about the town boards
concerns and interests, they put together a preliminary proposal and asked
the other boards how the design could be improved. A number of integrative
solutions were developed too, concerning the access road, nitrate loading, and
architectural details.
3.5 Summary
These three cases were all similar projects but had different experiences
in getting approval. In the Cummaquid Hills case, the developer received
approval after five hearings spanning six months. In the Shorebrook Park
case, the developer received approval after four separate nights of hearings at
the Zoning Board of Appeals extending over for two months--and then the
reduced density rendered the project unfeasible. It took another year before
all the appeal was been heard and decided in favor of the developer. In the
German Hill case, the developer received approval from the Zoning Board of
Appeals on the second of two nights within one week. What accounted for
these differences? Chapter 4 compares the different experiences of the
developers.
CHAPTER 4 - CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS
This chapter analyzes the three cases described in chapter 3. I compare
the cases to determine to what extent comprehensive permitting reduced the
amount of duplication and what steps the developer went through to have
the issues considered inclusively instead of one at a time. The cases suggest
that comprehensive permitting reduces the amount of duplication for both
the developer and town boards, but does not necessarily result in a fast
decision. The cases also suggest that the issues can be considered inclusively,
but that the comprehensive permit hearing is not a forum where the various
interests and concerns can be reconciled. Finally, the comprehensive permit
process ankd appeal to the HAC seems to give false expectations to developers
that their project will be approved quickly. Zoning Boards of Appeals may
find it in the best interest to deny a project and wait for the HAC to overturn
their decision--this delays projects.
The cases were all residential developments from the same town,
proposed in the late 1980s. There are, however, differences in the proposed
densities, specific sites, substantive issues, and actual proposals; each of which
could have informed how the developers used the formal and informal
process. Previous experience could also be a factor in a developer's strategy to
seek approval; the cooperation in the German Hill case could have been in
response the contentiousness of the Shorebrook Park case. An ideal study
would hold all of these factors constant. Nevertheless, it is possible to
identify whether there was duplication and what steps the developer took to
have the issues considered inclusively instead of one at a time.
4.1 Reducing the Amount of Duplication
To determine if duplication was reduced, I looked at how many
separate hearings there were for the developer to attend, whether the
developer was whipsawed (i.e., required by different boards to meet
conflicting requirements), and how many times the developer had to
redesign the proposal once the hearings started.
Number of Separate Hearings
In the Cummaquid Hills case, the developer went through many
different reviews in order to get final subdivision and cluster approval: (1)
pre-application review, (2) preliminary review, (3) site plan review, (4) cluster
cor cept review, (5) Board of Health review, (6) Conservation Commission
review, and (7) final subdivision review. The developer submitted virtually
the same design each time. The Planning Board reviewed the proposal four
times and offered comments to the Zoning Board of Appeals once; the Board
of Health reviewed the proposal twice; and the other boards each reviewed
the project once and submitted comments to the Zoning Board of Appeals.
For each hearing, the developer made separate applications and
presentations. The whole process of getting approval, from applying for a
preliminary plan approval to filing the final map with the City Clerk, took six
months.
Theoretically, each step in the traditional development review process
looks at different issues. The preliminary subdivision (sketch plan) review
step should inform the Planning Board aware that a subdivision is being
considered and give the developer feedback before he is entrenched in a
specific design. Site plan review is supposed to consider the internal impacts
of the project. Tentative plan approval by the Planning Board (or special
permit for the cluster concept by the Zoning Board of Appeals) is supposed to
consider impacts external to the site. Finally, the Planning Board must
approve the final subdivision plan, even though if the project meets all the
conditions of the tentative plan approval, final approval cannot be denied.
While the scope of review is supposed to differ at each stage, in reality the
different boards still look at the same issues, even though they cannot make
decisions on issues outside their mandate.
In the Cummaquid Hills case, not only were there many reviews, but
the boards considered issues which were under the mandate of other boards.
The Site Plan Review Team was mandated to approve the proposal on
internal (on-site) considerations only, but they also considered off-site nitrate-
loading, areawide traffic, and community use of open space. The Zoning
Board of Appeals was mandated to only give approval on communitywide
(off-site) planning issues, but they considered the setbacks and driveway
width for lot 13 too. Where the "official" process envisioned substantive
issues being considered separately, the town boards supplemented the process
with their own more-inclusive reviews and this was repetitive.
Compare this to comprehensive permitting. In both the Shorebrook
Park and German Hill cases the developer made only one application, which
was forwarded to each town board, and one presentation to the Zoning Board
of Appeals. Issues which were divided between many different boards in the
Cummaquin Hills case were consolidated into the Zoning Board of Appeals
hearing, and there was no preliminary approval--only a single final decision.
Where in the Cummaquid Hills case, the hearings took six months, the
Shorebrook Park hearings took two months and the German Hill hearings
took only one week. Time was saved by only submitting one application and
only making one presentation and because there was no lengthy staff review
nor waiting to get on the agendas of the many boards. Perhaps time was also
saved because many boards did not each consider the same issues; what might
have been repetitive discussion was consolidated into the Zoning Board of
Appeals' hearing. All these factors contributed to shortening the time before
a final decision on the comprehensive permit was issued.
While receiving a decision through comprehensive permitting seems
faster than if the developer has to assemble many approvals from many
different boards, the Shorebrook Park illustrates that a fast decision is not
necessarily a good thing. The 25 unit limitation was economically unfeasible;
the developer could not even think about building until the State Housing
Appeals Committee decided his appeal, (and even then this was pursued by
the town up to the State Supreme Judicial Court). Both comprehensive
permit projects were approved, but the German Hill case demonstrates that
time invested in building consensus among the boards before submitting an
application is not time wasted. This idea is discussed later in this chapter.
Whipsawing
Meeting all the varying interests and regulations when designing a
project is difficult enough, but more so when one board's interests or
regulations contradict those of another board. In traditional development
review, developers may be whipsawed--that is, required by one board to make
changes that contradict the requirements of another board. Where
requirements or interests conflict, the developer must either obtain waivers
or seek re-approval by boards who have already given approval on the
original proposal. Whipsawing is most frustrating and problematic after the
developer has begun the hearing process because this is when it is most time-
consuming and costly to redesign projects. Comprehensive permitting
eliminates whipsawing because it exposes contradictions to the decision-
making board. Where only one board reviews the proposal, the dilemma of
choosing which of the conflicting standards to apply to the proposal becomes
the responsibility of that board. The developer is relieved of shuttling back
and forth between boards to obtain waivers or seek re-approvals.
While the developer in the Cummaquid Hills case did not seem to be
whipsaw ed, the possibility certainly existed. Both the Zoning Board of
Appeals and the Board of Health approved the reduced septic system setback
on lot 13. Suppose, however, that the Board of Health found that reducing
the septic system setback on lot 13 would be detrimental to the pond (or that
the soil on the entire property was unsuitable for the intensity of the
proposed septic systems), the developer would have had to redesign the
project and seek re-approvals from the Planning Board, Site Plan Review
Team, and Zoning Board of Appeals.
Eliminating whipsawing eliminates one source of uncertainty for
developers (the problems of which were discussed in chapter 1). But towns
also benefit from eliminating whipsawing. Where a developer shuttles
between boards, his focus is on a specific project, not broader policy.
Comprehensive permitting makes the town explicitly aware of
inconsistencies in their policies and interests, highlighting them for future
development proposals. Where there may be little communication between
town boards, this is the first step in initiating action to resolve inconsistencies
on a policy level.
Redesigns
While comprehensive permitting eliminates a developer's
responsibility to meet two conflicting standards, it does not eliminate the
need to redesign proposals. The Shorebrook Park case illustrates this point.
The Zoning Board of Appeals approved only 25 total units, down from the
originally proposed 64, and required that the developer redesign and submit
the proposal again for review. The requirement was affirmed by the Housing
Appeals Committee when they overturned the Zoning Board of Appeals'
decision and allowed 47 total units.
The German Hill proposal was approved virtually unchanged from the
comprehensive permit application. How did the Fair Housing Committee
and Dacey accomplish this? All of the issues were explored prior to the
application being submitted. The Fair Housing Committee, Dacey, and town
boards explored many ideas and design options before there was commitment
to any one proposal. Getting this consensus was a proactive measure to
ensure that the final cornrehensive permit was acceptable to every board.
The Fair Housing Committee did not follow the traditional "decide,
announce, defend" sequence of development, where the developer "decides"
on the design, "announces" the decision, and then "defends" the decision at
the hearings. Instead, the Fair Housing Committee "decided" and
"announced" jointly with the town boards, eliminating the need for
defending the design at the hearings.
These pre-application discussions were not unique to the German Hill
case. A pre-application review, such as the Cummaquid Hills developer
attended, is supposed to be a chance for the boards to give feedback to the
developer about the concept so that the preliminary plan may meet the
interests and formal requirements before an application is submitted. The
developer of Cummaquid Hills could have gone through the same pre-filing
negotiation as the Fair Housing Committee and Dacey in the German Hill
case. There is, however, a greater difficulty holding together the agreement
through many hearings and board reviews. Where many town boards must
give approval on a project, if one board requires a change, the other town
boards must re-evaluate the new information; the entire deal might be
sacrificed. Comprehensive permitting offers developers more assurance that
agreements reached in their pre-application discussions will either remain
undisturbed or that the one decision-making board considers all the trade-offs
before requiring changes. Where many town boards can tinker with the
proposal, no single board is looking out for the synergistic effects of requiring
even only one change.
4.2 Considering All Issues at Once
Proponents of comprehensive permitting argue that considering all
issues and trade-offs at once not only reduces duplication, but also improves
the quality of the proposed development. To see what steps were taken to
have all the issues considered at once, I looked at whether the developer
sought assistance from the various town boards in designing the project,
whether the developer explored many design options, and whether there
were integrative solutions developed to resolve issues.
The comprehensive permit process envisions bringing together the
developer and Zoning Board of Appeals where the Zoning Board of Appeals
speaks for the interests and concerns of the town boards. This creates a forum
(the Zoning Board of Appeals hearing) for discussing all the interests of the
various town boards at once. Each town board submits comments about what
issues they want the Zoning Board of Appeals to discuss in the hearing and
consider in their decision. The Zoning Board of Appeals then reviews the
application in light of the concerns and interests of the various town boards.
This formal process seemed to be followed closely in the Shorebrook
Park case. The developer designed the project, submitted the application, and
attended the Zoning Board of Appeals hearings to defend it. The Zoning
Board of Appeals' hearing was the forum for meeting the different interests
and reconciling the concerns of different boards. But the sheer number and
complexity of interests and concerns was more than the ZBA seemed willing
or able to balance. A subcommittee was formed to try to fashion an
integrative compromise design. At the subcommittee meetings, two
representatives of the Zoning Board of Appeals met with the developer and
representatives from other town boards.
By the time the subcommittee formed, the developer had a significant
financial and time investment in the original proposal. Perhaps because the
developer tried to reduce the extent to which the proposal would need to be
redesigned, the negotiations within the subcommittee were more of a
haggling over the number of units and discussion of how substantive issues
were related to the economic viability of the project rather than an
exploration for integrative solutions to meet the underlying interests of the
town boards and Zoning Board of Appeals. Although a "forum" existed
where all issues would be discussed (the Zoning Board of Appeals' hearing),
the issues were too complex and there seemed to be an unwillingness to use
the supplemental negotiations to improve the proposal.
The German Hill case differs from the Shorebrook Park case because all
the interests of the various town boards were met and concerns reconciled
prior to the Zoning Board of Appeals' hearing. The "forum" that the
comprehensive permit process created was preceded by informal negotiations
which spawned innovative and integrative solutions. And this worked in
part because the developer could be mostly confident that the agreements
would stand--that only one board, instead of many might tinker with the
proposal. Instead of the Zoning Board of Appeals' hearing being a place for
hashing out differences, the discussions could focus on verifying that the
proposal met all the formal requirements and interests of the town boards.
Getting Assistance from Town Boards and Exploring Many Options
Seeking pre-application assistance from the town boards serves two
purposes. First, it gives the developer some knowledge of what the various
boards' interests and concerns are for that particular site and project.
Developers can anticipate the types of questions that a board might have for
their proposal and address them explicitly either in the design or at the
hearing. For example, in the Cummaquid Hills case, the Fire Chief was
concerned about driveway alignment on two of the lots. Although the lots
met the strict requirements of the law, when applied to the site, the Fire Chief
wanted the driveways to be still wider for better access. The second benefit of
a pre-application review is that it gives a developer greater certainty whether
the proposal will be approved or denied--in theory, if a board helps design a
proposal, then, feeling more commitment to it, they will be more likely to
support it in hearings.
In all cases, the developers talked to town boards before submitting
applications, but to different degrees. In the Cummaquid Hills case, the
developer only attended a pre-hearing conference, suggested in the Yarmouth
Zoning By-Law. In the Shorebrook Park case, the developer only met with
the Board of Selectmen to inform them of his proposal (a requirement of the
MHFA site approval process). In neither case did the developers seek
additional assistance, nor did they alter the project concept to address the
concerns discussed in the pre-application meetings. The Cummaquid Hills
developer did not reduce the setbacks nor widen the driveways, but instead
applied for a variance (perhaps hoping to get around the possibility that the
Zoning Board of Appeals might require that the driveways be redesigned).
The Shorebrook Park developer did not decrease the project's density. Not
changing the proposals might indicate that alternative design options were
left unexplored. And this is not surprising. Neither developer expected that
changes would be required, but were prepared nonetheless. The Cummaquid
Hills developer made out an application for a variance and the Shorebrook
Park developer knew that he could appeal to the HAC. The formal process
seemed to give options that the developers perceived as better than
redesigning the proposals. It is interesting to note that in both cases, the
concerns mentioned in the early meetings were not forgotten--they were
again and again throughout the hearings process.
In the German Hill case, however, there was frequent and open
communication between the Fair Housing Committee, Dacey and the various
town boards to design the project. Ideas were shared and design options were
explored (given the general guidelines of 37 total units and housing prices to
remain within the HOP specifications) before there was commitment to any
one proposal. The Zoning Board of Appeals, having been involved in the
preliminary design, knew what concessions had already been made, and why
the project was designed as it was. In keeping the Zoning Board of Appeals
informed of their progress, the Fair Housing Committee and Dacey answered
many questions before they became contentious issues. The extensive pre-
application collaboration was very long--approximately one year--but in the
hearings, not only was there no opposition from the boards, the boards
actually endorsed the project.
Integrative Solutions
In neither the Cummaquid Hills case, nor the Shorebrook Park case
were there integrative solutions. How could there have been solutions
integrating many issues if the developers did not talk to the town boards and
explore options? Developers do not have a monopoly on good ideas. That
there were no integrative solutions in the Cummaquid Hills case might also
be because of the difficulty of boards making commitments contingent upon
action taken by other boards. For example, the Planning Board could have
withdrawn their request to eliminate lot 13 in exchange for concessions from
other boards. In order to get this sort of agreement, the developer would
have to get both boards to independently approve it and as mentioned above,
not be assured that another board would not undo it.
In the German Hill case, there were extraordinarily integrative
agreements. Phasing the construction of the access and internal roads
required approval by the Engineering and Fire Departments. Using the Board
of Selectmen's proposal to include approximately 30 acres of abutting town-
owned open space in their nitrate-loading calculations required approval by
the Board of Health, Water Department, and Conservation Commission
Leaving the interior of the second stories of some units unfinished to offset
costs of additional exterior detail required by the Old King's Highway
Regional Historic Commission required approval by the Building Inspector.
It is interesting to note the these agreements were not technical solutions,
rather they were a reframing of the problem--something that is unlikely to
occur when only haggling over the number of units.
4.3 Considering Political Interests
The Shorebrook developer seemed to decide (perhaps only implicitly)
that trying to get approval for a very dense project was a better option than
compromising. There seems to be little incentive for a developer to go
beyond the formal comprehensive permit process because developers look at
the record of the Housing Appeals Committee and see that it has historically
favored developers and overturned Zoning Board of Appeals' decisions. As
shown in Table 2 (in Chapter 2), the Housing Appeals Committee has ruled
in favor of the developer's proposal in approximately 90 percent of the cases
which the HAC decided.
The developer might get approval from the Housing Appeals
Committee, but many of the projects approved at that stage are abandoned.
The statistics show that fewer projects get built following a Housing Appeals
Committee approval than following only a Zoning Board of Appeals
approval.5 6 The shift in power due to possibility of the Housing Appeals
Committee overriding the local decision is less pronounced than originally
envisioned when the law was enacted.
While developers see that they can appeal a decision to the Housing
Appeals Committee, the Zoning Board of Appeals can also use the Housing
Appeals Committee to advance their interests. A Zoning Board of Appeals
might have an interest in denying the project or attaching uneconomic
conditions in an attempt to stall the final decision. Delay often works against
a developer, making a project uneconomic with extended carrying costs. In
addition, funding, labor, or material commitments for the project may dry up
before a p.oject receives approval or be exhausted just in getting approval.
Another reason that Zoning Board of Appeals might want to deny a project is
that they can use the Housing Appeals Committee as a scapegoat for making
the tough decision. In the Shorebrook Park case, the Zoning Board of Appeals
almost had to deny the permit or as they did, approve a maximum of 25
units, because they are appointed by the Board of Selectmen, and could easily
not be re-appointed at the expiration of their terms.
But the Housing Appeals Committee override is only part of the Anti-
Snob Zoning Law. The comprehensive permit also changes bargaining power
internally between town boards. Comprehensive permitting shifts bargaining
power to the Zoning Board of Appeals from the from other town boards. By
having their interests represented by the Zoning Board of Appeals, other
56. Resnick. "Mediating Affordable Housing Disputes in Massachusetts:
Optimal Intervention Points."
town boards lose the power to decide for themselves whether or not their
interests are met and the power to enforce solutions to meet their concerns.
The Zoning Board of Appeals, may amplify or disregard the interests and
concerns of the other town boards. In the Shorebrook Park case, the Board of
Selectmen could not attach their conditions to the project as they might have
done if they were had permitting authority. Instead, they put pressure on the
Zoning Board of Appeals to approve the project with a maximum of 25 units
(and certainly some of this pressure came from the Board of Selectmen's
authority to appoint the Zoning Board of Appeals).
Comprehensive permitting also takes bargaining power away from
potential objectors. Objectors generally lose their power to get concessions by
threatening to delay projects;57 there are fewer stages at which delays can
occur. Historically, and to this day, a powerful strategy for objectors has been
to stall projects through the hearing process or through litigation with one or
more agencies. Comprehensive permitting, by centralizing decision-making,
reduces objectors' ability to challenge actions taken by individual boards.
Interestingly enough, citizen participation was not an important factor in any
of the three cases; this is perhaps because the sites are all in remote areas. But
note that the formal comprehensive permit process only requires that notice
be sent to abutters and other interested town residents for the Zoning Board
of Appeals' hearings. Unless the other town boards hold information
57. This idea is expressed in Wheeler, Michael. "Resolving Local Regulatory
Disputes and Building Consensus for Affordable." in DiPasquale and
Keyes. Building Foundations: Housing and Federal Policy. Page 214 and
Resnick. "Mediating Affordable Housing Disputes in Massachusetts:
Optimal Intervention Points." Page 26.
hearings (which occasionally happens), residents do not have input into town
boards' comments to the Zoning Board of Appeals.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, I have tried to show that comprehensive permitting
addresses some of the problems which resulted from the proliferation of
regulation. The number of hearings is reduced, whipsawing is eliminated,
and only one board can require redesigns; yet there is still delay. Also,
comprehensive permitting forces developers to attend pre-application
meetings, and by establishing a forum for discussing all issues at once, it
facilitates the exploration of many options and integrative agreements; yet
developers submit proposals that a Zoning Board of Appeals cannot
(politically) approve. The Anti-Snob Zoning Act envisioned both simplifying
the development review process through comprehensive permitting and
taking away a town's power to reject affordable housing proposals. But
developers must still get approval from a board that must address a
multitude of technically complex issues and consider that the Zoning Board
of Appeals still has the power of delay.
CHAPTER 5- COMPREHENSIVE PERMITTING IS ONE FORM OF
REGULATORY NEGOTIATION
As we can see from chapter 4, the comprehensive permit process does
not meet the goals that it was originally developed to meet. As illustrated by
the Shorebrook Park case, developers do what is expected of them under the
law, but the comprehensive permit does not really simplify the decision-
making process. And rulings from the Housing Appeals Committee, even if
favorable, often come too late. The law envisions the Zoning Board of
Appeals synthesizing the various interests and concerns of town boards and
other parties at the comprehensive permit hearing. In reality though, the
sheer number of interested parties, technical complexity of information, and
political interests complicates this task.
5.1 Comprehensive Permitting is More Complex Than Originally Expected
Reconciling all the different interests and concerns is often too complex
for Zoning Boards of Appeals. There are more parties in a comprehensive
permit process than originally anticipated. The proliferation of regulation
has resulted in there being more parties and more interests for each
development proposal. There is new regulation for environmental concerns
that did not exist in 1969 when the Anti-Snob Zoning Act was enacted.
Addressing these additional concerns has complicated the task of Zoning
Boards of Appeals meeting all interests in their final decision. In the
Shorebrook Park case, the subcommittee was formed to assist the Zoning
Board of Appeals, but as noted, the developer was too entrenched in the
original design to make meaningful trade-offs possible.
In addition to the increased amount of regulation, the issues addressed
in the regulations are becoming more technical and more difficult to
understand. Zoning Boards of Appeals do not have the expertise to judge the
effects of making trade-offs among all the issues, especially when they are as
technical, subjective, or dependant on other factors such nitrate-loading,
architectural detail, and phasing of construction tasks. Where a Zoning Board
of Appeals can take the advice of town boards on single issues (for example,
whether or not the proposal meets nitrate loading standards), no single board
itself can evaluate what construction standards for an access road could be
loosened in exchange for reducing density. The town boards and developer
must determine what trade-offs are optimal. That Zoning Boards of Appeals
make sub-optimal trade-offs might also explain the increasing number of
appeals to the Housing Appeals Committee based on burdensome conditions.
Zoning Boards of Appeals might be enforcing some issues without realizing
how that requirement impacts the profitability of the project overall. 58
And developers realize that the Housing Appeals Committee most
often rules in their favor, and it is therefore rational to expect that will try to
maximize the number of units and request many waivers. Developers do not
perceive an incentive to design projects that a Zoning Board of Appeals can
approve and still look like they made a wise decision. It might therefore be
best for a Zoning Board of Appeals to deny the project and then blame the
Housing Appeals Committee when they are forced to approve it. In the
Shorebrook Park case, the developer followed this formal process with little
additional work. The developer applied for a comprehensive permit and
58. See Chapter 2.3 Experience with Comprehensive Permits and Appeals to
the HAC
requested a number of waivers for a very high density project. The Zoning
Board of Appeals, however, could not accept a proposal which more than
doubled the Board of Selectmen's guidelines when they are appointed by the
Board of Selectmen. Zoning Boards of Appeals do not simply review the
application to see if there is a local need and if it meets health, planning, and
safety factors, they also must maintain their political viability. The
application process seems easier for a developer, but it is not a replacement
for the political needs of the Zoning Board of Appeals. The comprehensive
permit hearing is actually more complex than what was originally
envisioned. There are more interests to reconcile, more complex issues to
deal with, and political concerns to consider.
Finally, we are seeing that towns arp using the law to proactively meet
their affordable housing requirement (that is determine for themselves how
they will meet the state-mandated 10 percent goal), and thus eliminate the
possibility of the Housing Appeals Committee overriding other
comprehensive permit decisions. This is what happened in the German Hill
case. Recent regulations have created incentives for towns to work
cooperatively with developers, 59 but the original Anti-Snob Zoning Act did
not envision that communities would actively plan for and seek developers
to build affordable housing. The law does not explicitly encourage this
proactive cooperation nor give guidelines for a community to go about doing
this; each community must invent its own method and adapt it as it
59. Edith Netter in "Bridging the Housing Gap" discusses Housing Plans and
the Local Initiative Program as two ways in which community's are
encourages to work with developers in building affordable housing.
progresses. Perhaps towns must go through a Shorebrook Park-type case
before they see the possibility for and potential benefit of a German Hill.60
Given that comprehensive permitting does not necessarily simplify the
development review process, and that there are no regulations telling how to
cooperatively develop affordable housing, what are guidelines for developers
and communities to follow to meet the goals of simplifying the development
review process developers and meeting affordable housing needs for towns?
5.2 Comprehensive Permitting Should be Recast as Regulatory Negotiation
The German Hill case is similar to other public dispute resolution
efforts. The Fair Housing Committee and Dacey's success in getting early
assistance from all the town boards and thus quick approval from the Zoning
Board of Appeals suggests that comprehensive permitting in general should
be recast as regulatory negotiation. Regulatory negotiation, in short, is a
process where interested parties such as environmental groups, the business
sector, and affected consumers assist agencies in their traditional functions
such as permitting, rulemaking, enforcement, grant-making, investment
strategies, and rate-setting. Typically the parties seek consensus on what
action to take before that action is formally implemented. Theoretically, if all
the interests are met during the negotiations, then there will not be later
challenges to the action. Regulatory negotiation is illustrated by the following
60. An interesting study beyond the scope of this thesis would be if (and why
or why not) towns always have a contentious case before they attempt to
proactively develop affordable housing.
case of Anyport harbor where a creative agreement for where to put dredged
material was developed through negotiation.61
Everyone at Anyport agreed that something needed to be done to
preserve the town's maritime industry, but not at expense of marine
environment. Anyport harbor is the major industry in town and is used by
both cargo ships and pleasure boaters. Because of its safe harbor on the
otherwise rocky shoreline, Anyport operates the only loading dock within 300
miles. Anyport is also a regular stop for pleasure boaters because there are
good facilities for maintenance and repair work. Revenues from the cargo
transport operation help keep the facilities up-to-date and in good condition.
In 1990,however, Anyport needed to dredge its shipping channel again and
there seemed to be no good place to put the spoils. The current dumping site
was recently closed because of damage to fish populations, and a new
designated site had not yet been opened.
A section 404 dredge-and-fill permit from the Army Corps of Engineers
(under the Clean Water Act) is required for dumping dredge spoils. The
Army Corps of Engineers is required to consult with the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to be sure that projects under consideration are not
damaging to the environment. If the EPA finds that there would be
unacceptable environmental damage, they may object to the issuance of the
permit. The permit is moved to the federal hierarchy at this stage where the
61. The case is mostly fictitious with facts taken from many different
situations and some facts invented to demonstrate specific objectives.
404 permits which are required under the terms of the Clean Water Act
have been successfully negotiated. See Susskind, Bacow, and Wheeler.
Resolving Environmental Regulatory Disputes for one true case.
Army Corps Division Engineer (and then if necessary, the Chief Engineer in
Washington D.C.) tries to resolve the differences with the EPA. Failing that,
the EPA administrator has the final authority to deny the permit.
State and federal officials encouraged the harbor master at Anyport to
use an offshore site they had been studying for some time as a possible new
permanent site. That site, however, was up for consideration to be designated
an ocean sanctuary and Coastal Advocates, an environmental group, had
already called upon the EPA to intervene and not allow the dumping.
Anticipating that the shipping channel would be prohibitively shallow before
the 404 permit could be issued, the harbor master decided to try to negotiate a
solution before applying to the Army Corps for a permit. He envisioned that
the negotiated solution would be the proposal that the Army Corps would
consider.
The harbor master called upon a mediator from the local university to
bring together all the parties who might have an interest in where to put the
dredge spoils. Six major parties in addition to the harbor were invited to the
negotiations. The Army Corps of Engineers would carry out the dredging and
transport to the dumping site. The Army Corps generally pays a large portion
of dredging costs and so they wanted to keep costs down as much as possible.
The EPA needed to be assured that there would be no unacceptable damage to
the environment. The State Department of Environmental Management
regulates development along the shoreline and was invited because the
dredging plans might ultimately have affected the expansion of the harbor
which DEM would later have to approve. A representative of the Mayor's
office was present to support the harbor master. Residents of a wealthy
neighborhood along the channel did not want the expansion because it might
result in increased boating traffic. Finally, Coastal Advocates, a coalition of
environmental groups was concerned that the dredging and disposal
activities would significantly affect natural processes and harm the living
systems in the channel and offshore.
Because the harbor needed to be dredged right away, the parties agreed
to a schedule of one-half day meetings held every two weeks until they
developed a solution. There were a total of four meetings held. At the first
meeting, the mediator convened the negotiators at the harbor and together
the negotiators walked around the harbor and discussed each party's interests
and concerns about the dredging project. This helped build a common
understanding of the site and issues. Before leaving at the end of the day, the
mediator encouraged the negotiators to each think of three places that the
spoils might go (an ideal place, an acceptable place, and an unacceptable place).
At the second meeting, the negotiators presented their ideas and asked
questions of each other. The mediator summarized the discussion and noted
that none of the parties identified the offshore site as ideal. Two other sites
were noted more by at least three of the negotiators as either acceptable or
ideal: a diked agricultural area adjacent to the harbor, and a marsh,
approximately one-mile inland which people had been using for years to
dump yard waste and abandoned automobiles. At the third meeting, the
discussions focused around which of these two sites was more suitable and
what information would be needed (and who would gather it) to make a final
decision.
At the fourth meeting, the group agreed that the adjacent agricultural
land was the best option because it had the cheapest transport costs and with
the spoils, the Army Corps of Engineers could restore the wetland which had
been drained for agriculture. In addition, the harbor agreed to reduce the
operating hours of the loading dock and consolidate their expansion activities
on a smaller area to buffer the wetland from runoff and undue noise.
Following three months of planning for dredging and designing the new
wetland (dump site), the Army Corps of Engineers issued the 404 permit with
no objections.
The agreement met the needs of each party. The Army Corps would be
certain that the EPA would not override their authority; the EPA suggested
the diked agricultural area and thus did not oppose it; the harbor could get
their permit and begin dredging right away; the residents' concerns about
boating traffic were addressed in the agreement to operate only during certain
hours; and the environmental groups not only had their concerns about the
dumping met, but als, ie-created a wetland.
The negotiation over the dump site for the dredge spoils had six
characteristics common to most cases of regulatory negotiation:
(1) The process was ad-hoc. Convening the parties, discussing interests
and concerns, and developing the final agreement did not follow a pre-
established process; the mediator and the parties developed a process to
meet their particular need of getting approval quickly so dredging
could begin right away.
(2) The negotiations were informal and did not occur in a bureaucratized
fashion. In a formal hearing to decide the permit, parties or their hired
advocates may only get three minutes to testify in support or
opposition to the proposal; in the negotiation, the parties themselves
could speak for much longer and were encouraged to brainstorm
without taking a position in favor or opposition to the ideas. And the
power of parties to decide if the agreement meets their interests
remained in their hands and not the hand of elected or appointed
representatives.
(3) The negotiators conducted fact-finding jointly. By walking around the
harbor, the group built a common information base. Also, the group
deciled what information might be needed to evaluate the proposed
sites and who would gather it, thus adding legitimacy to whatever
information would be used.
(4) The negotiation was managed by a mediator. The mediator convened
the parties and kept the process both moving quickly by assigning tasks
(such as thinking of three places to consider) and focused by
summarizing the discussions at the end of each day.
(5) The decision was made by consensus. In this case all the parties
benefitted; sometimes parties may not benefit, but they agree to not
challenge the outcome because they recognize that it is the best possible
outcome and determine for themselves that they can live with it. At a
formal hearing, other interested parties do not have a vote in the final
outcome.
(6) Finally, the process was supplementary to the formal decision-making
process, occurring before the application was made. The negotiators,
including the Army Corps of Engineers and EPA helped develop the
proposal with which the harbor master would apply to the Army Corps
of Engineers. The negotiator did not issue the permit, but jointly
developed the proposal that would need to be approved through the
formal process.
5.3 Summary
Because comprehensive permitting is characterized by having many
different interests, technically complex information, and political concerns, it
should be thought of as regulatory negotiation.
An ad-hoc process is necessary because not every comprehensive
permit case is the same; the parties need to develop a process that meets their
particular needs--for example, sorting through a large number of interests or
conducting extensive fact-finding. The custom-designed process, in order to
optimize the final proposal, should also allow for more open communication
between the decision-making board, other town boards, and developer than
generally occurs in the formal process. Reconciling many different interests
and understanding complex technical information cannot be accomplished
when parties must communicate to the decision-making board through
written comments and formal testimony. And it is important to build a
common information base among the parties. An uninformed (non-expert)
decision-making board cannot possibly understand complex information if
testimony by one party's "expert" contradicts that of another "expert."
Also, it is important that all the town boards recognize that the
proposal is the best possible outcome and determine for themselves that they
can live with it. This helps ensure that the town boards can meet their
political interests by approving the proposal, and not only by opposing it,
even though they may not have a vote in the final outcome. Creating such a
viable outcome is best achieved before the developer becomes entrenched in
his proposal and before town boards have a formal opportunity to oppose the
proposal. The Shorebrook Park case demonstrates that creative problem-
solving is difficult if it is attempted once the formal hearings have started.
For this reason, the negotiations should precede the formal decision-making
process and result in a joint proposal to the decision-making board.
Finally, comprehensive permitting should provide that a mediator be
hired. In the German Hill case, the mediator's specific tasks were in getting
started, helping prepare the agenda (preparing the RFP), inventing and
packaging options, and binding the parties. The mediator also arranged and
facilitated discussions with various town boards and suggested possible ways
of meeting the various interests. Lastly, the mediator helped commit the
parties to the design by documenting the opinions and agreements reached
into a memorandum of understanding.62 A mediator brings process skills to
the project and adds credibility to the possible solutions.63
62. For a good discussion of what roles a mediator might play, see: Susskind
and Cruikshank. Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches the
Resolving Public Disputes. Page 142.
63. An interesting study would be whether a Zoning Board of Appeals or
staff to the Board could play the role of mediator. To test this empirically
requires that many more cases be analyzed. For general disucssion about
How then can we encourage parties to think of comprehensive
permitting as regulatory negotiation? One option is to educate town officials.
Recall in the Shorebrook Park case that the executive secretary to the Board of
Selectmen attended a workshop on comprehensive permitting, and that at
the workshop, negotiation with developers was encouraged. Although the
workshop did not seem to get the message of consensual negotiation across to
the executive secretary, it is an example of educating local officials about
negotiation. Education might also be a mandatory requirement of being
appointed to the Zoning Board of Appeals.
Another way to encourage regulatory negotiation is to provide state
funding. This is already done for the Office of Dispute Resolution Mediation
Program, but this program occurs only once an appeal has been filed.
Expanding the HAC-sponsored Office of Dispute Resolution Mediation
Program and providing funding is not a new suggestion.64 It is important to
note though that regulatory negotiation is contextually different from the
HAC program. In regulatory negotiation, there might be many parties; in the
HAC program, negotiation generally takes place between only the Zoning
Board of Appeals and the developer. Also, when initiating regulatory
negotiation, the issues are less-defined than in the HAC program. Such early
intervention will likely be a longer (and therefore more costly) commitment.
this idea and med/arb in general, see: Goldberg, et. al. Dispute
Resolution and Susskind and Cruikshank. Breaking the Impasse.
64. Resnick. "Mediating Affordable Housing Disputes in Massachusetts:
Optimal Intervention Points."
A third option for encouraging regulatory negotiation is to authorize
its use in the regulations themselves. An example of this is the Mediation
Option in the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code. 65 The
Pennsylvania Mediation Option states that mediation is voluntary and
recognizes that cases differ; therefore, instead of telling municipalities exactly
how mediation should be conducted, it lays out seven items which must be
considered to before mediation has a legitimate chance of success: (1) funding
mediation, (2) selecting a mediator, (3) time-limits and other closure
requirements for mediation, (4) suspending formal time limits on board
action, (5) identifying all interested parties, (6) determining if the mediation
will be open or closed to the public, and (7) assuring that mediated solutions
are in writing and signed by parties.
In sum, there are many ways to encourage that comprehensive
permitting be considered as regulatory negotiation. The three that I suggest
here have been tried. No one is the best in all situations.
65. Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, § 908.1 - Description of
Mediation Option. Other references to the Mediation Option include: §
508 (7) - section on Subdivision Plat Approval, § 609 (f) - section on
Zoning Ordinance Amendments, and § section on Planning Residential
Developments.
CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION
I analyzed the comprehensive permit process authorized in the
Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zoning Act whereby developers apply to the Zoning
Board of Appeals for one approval in lieu of all other local level permits. The
Massachusetts comprehensive permit is supposed to simplify the
development review process for affordable housing projects. Proponents of
comprehensive permitting argue that comprehensive permitting both speeds
up the decision-making process and improves the quality of the proposed
development because all the issues regarding its benefits and impacts are
considered at the same.
I analyzed three cases testing to what extent the goals of comprehensive
permitting were met. My criteria for evaluating whether the process was
indeed faster were: (1) How many times the developer had to redesign the
proposal once the hearings started; (2) Was the developer whipsawed; and, (3)
How many separate hearings there were for the developer to attend. To see
what steps were taken to have all the issues considered at once, I considered:
(1) Whether the developer sought assistance from the various town boards or
the community in designing the project; (2) Whether the developer explored
many design options, or seemed to settle on only one; and (3) Whether there
were integrative solutions developed to resolve issues.
From the cases, it appears that the number of hearings is reduced,
whipsawing is eliminated, and only one board can require redesigns; yet there
is still delay. Also, comprehensive permitting forces developers to attend pre-
application meetings, and by establishing a forum for discussing all issues at
once, it facilitates the exploration of many options and integrative
agreements; yet developers submit proposals that a Zoning Board of Appeals
cannot (politically) approve.
Comprehensive permitting, is characterized by many different
interests, technically complex information, and political concerns--all issues
which have been resolved through regulatory negotiation. Comprehensive
permitting, therefore, should not be thought of only as means of simplifying
the development review process, it should be cast as regulatory negotiation.
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was the lack of certainty and predictability. The two basic problems
causing uncertainty are vague standards which allow discretion and an
unsatisfactory vested rights doctrine which fails to give protection to
developers in the regulatory process.
7. Merritt, Robert E. "The Permit Streamlining Act: The Dream and the
Reality." Land Use Forum. Vol. 1, No. 1, (Fall, 1991).
This article reviews California's Permit Streamlining Act (1977) which
generally provides application requirements and time limits and
standards for review. Three "judicial strikes" against the Act limit its
application: (1) legislative acts are not subject to the Act, (2) approvals
must wait legislative action, and (3) due process may be denied under
the Act.
8. Noble, John H., John S. Banta, and John S. Rosenberg. Groping Through
the Maze: Foreign Experience Applied to the U.S. Problem of
Coordinating Development Controls. Washington, D.C.: Conservation
Foundation, 1977.
"Developing land and reviewing proposed developments for their
conformity to planning and environmental requirements have
become increasingly cumbersome processes--frustrating in many ways
to all participants." This book analyzes attempts in foreign countries to
coordinate permitting procedures. Specifically, the authors look at
experience in England, Australia, The Netherlands, Mexico, and
France.
9. O'Mara, W. Paul. "Regulation Where Do We Go From Here?" Urban
Land. (May, 1978).
The Urban Land Institute conducted a seminar on regulatory reform in
February, 1978. The two problems identified were the confusing,
complex, and often contradictory system of regulations, and that
regulation has become ineffective, forcing development into less
regulated areas. Attempts at state and local reform options were
discussed at the seminar and are summarized in the article.
10. Popper, Frank, J. The Politics of Land Use Reform. Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1981.
Popper discusses the move to centralize planning and zoning
regulation in the 1970s. This book is a critical assessment of what this
centralized regulation has accomplished. Six state-level planning
programs are analyzed and evaluated with discussion about public and
bureaucratic implementatiu,, difficulties, economic effects of the
program, and environmental effects. Finally, Popper offers suggestions
for making centralized regulation work better.
11. Reilly, William, ed. The Use of Land: A Citizen's Policy Guide to Urban
Growth. New York: Crowell, 1973.
This book is the report of the Rockefeller Task Force on Land Use and
Urban Growth, created in the Summer, 1972. The report looks at ways
to "organize, control, and coordinate the process of urban development
so as to protect what we value most in the environmental, cultural,
and aesthetic characteristics of the land while meeting essential needs
of the changing U.S. population for new housing, roads, power plants,
shopping centers, parks, businesses, and industrial facilities."
12. Seidel, Stephen R. Housing Costs and Government Regulations:
Confronting the Regulatory Maze. New Brunswick, N.J.: Center for
Urban Policy Research, 1978.
This report analyzes the extent to which governmental regulations are
responsible for the recent rapid inflation in the price of new housing.
Seven areas of regulation are considered: building codes, energy
conservation codes, subdivision requirements, zoning controls, growth
controls, environmental controls, and financing regulations. The book
also contains some recommendations for ways in which government
regulations can be made more effective while also being less
burdensome to the housing industry.
13. So, Frank S. "Tips on Cutting the Delays of Regulation." Planning. Vol.
44, No. 9, (October, 1978).
This article suggests ways in which development review can be
accelerated. Specifically, it discusses: creating a single development
ordinance, developing a consolidated application, providing a form of
one-stop shopping or joint hearing, establishing an ombudsman or
permit expediter, putting time limits on decisions, various tinkering
with the regulatory process, using negotiation as a regulatory tool, and
taking the planning commission out of the process.
14. Urban Land Institute and Gruen, Gruen and Associates. Effects of
Regulation on Housing Costs: Two Case Studies. Washington, D.C.:
Urban Land Institute, 1977.
This ULI report looks at the effects of the increased land use and
environmental policies on housing costs, specifically, its effect on land
prices, developer costs, and developer profits. The report then turns to
two case studies: San Jose, CA and Jacksonville, FL. In San Jose, it w.
estimated that at least 20-30 percent of the cost of housing was due to
growth management policies. In Jacksonville, raw land prices and site
improvement costs increased more than the rate of inflation, but that
housing prices generally rose at about the same rate as inflation.
13. Urban Land Institute and Rice Cei.ter. The Cost of Delay Due to
Government Regulation in the Houston Housing Market. Washington,
D.C. : Urban Land Institute, 1979.
This report addresses three questions concerning the effect of
regulation on housing prices in Houston: What are the government
regulations which affect the housing development process? Are these
regulations increasing the time it takes to develop land? What are the
costs that this increased time brings about? The study concludes that
regulations have increased the time to develop land by approximately 5
1/2 months and that costs associated with regulation increased the
price of housing by approximately 10 percent.
16. Vig, Norman J. and Michael E. Kraft, eds. Environmental Policy in the
1990s. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990.
The first chapter of this book discusses environmental policy from the
1970s to the 1990s. During the 1970s, the amount of regulation
escalated, and this escalation continues. The trend seem to be one of
increased environmental regulation in an era of deregulation.
17. Vranicar, John, Welford Sanders, and David Mosena. Streamlining Land
Use Regulation: A Guidebook for Local Governments. Washington,
D.C.: Office of Policy Development and Research, United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1980.
This manual reports on successful streamlining techniques for zoning,
subdivision, environmental, and site-development ordinances. The
pros and cons of these techniques are examined, and advice for
assessing the effects of these techniques in other communities is given.
Negotiation and Mediation
1. Amy, Douglas. The Politics of Environmental Mediation. New York:
Columbia Press, 1987.
This book looks, not at the mediation process itself, but rather at the
politics of the process. By politics, Amy refers to the issues of power,
equality and democracy that are necessarily involved in any policy
making process. In writing the book, Amy assumes that mediation is a
new form of politics, and is not above it. The book compares both the
arguments describing the benefits of mediation as advocated by
mediators and arguments describing the limitations of mediation.
2. Bingham, Gail. Resolving Environmental Disputes: A Decade of
Experience. Washington, D.C.: Conservation Foundation, 1986.
This book looks at negotiating environmental disputes. It discusses the
beginnings and growth of the environmental dispute resolution field,
how efficient are environmental dispute resolution processes, and
what can be expected in the future. Using empirical data, the author
looks at how successful these processes have been, and suggests what
factors affect the likelihood of success. There are also summaries of
over 50 environmental disputes which have been negotiated.
3. Edelman, Peter B. "Institutionalizing Dispute Resolution Alternatives."
The Justice System Journal Vol. 9, No. 2, (Summer 1984).
Edelman talks about what it means to institutionalize dispute
resolution alternatives. Of particular interest is his discussion that
"institutionalization" is a relative term; a program may be
institutionalized in some ways but not in others. There are at least five
dimensions of institutionalization: extent of permanent financing,
comprehensive role within the substantive area covered, breadth of
substantive area covered, degree of compulsory participation, and
geographic scale.
4. Emrich, Wendy M. Using Mediation and Facilitation to Resolve
Pennsylvania's Local Land Use Controversies (Unpublished Paper).
Pittsburgh: PENNACCORD, Center for Environmental Dispute
Resolution.
Pennsylvania has a "Mediation Option" in the state enabling statute for
zoning, subdivision, and other local development controls. This paper
analyzes the text of the Mediation Option and discusses some questions
that frequently come up on the Mediation Option. The following
issues regarding local implementation are discussed: 1. funding
mediation, 2. selecting a mediator, 3. completing mediation, including
time limits, 4. suspending time limits otherwise authorized in the act,
5. identifying additional parties and affording them the opportunity to
participate, 6. whether the mediation sessions should be open or
closed, and 7. assuring that mediated solutions are in writing and
signed by the parties.
5. Emrich, Wendy, and Sweet, David. "Mediation Option Included in
Revisions to Pennsylvania's Municipalities Planning Code." EIA
Review, vol 4. no. 2, 1985.
This paper analyzes Pennsylvania's "Mediation Option" and includes a
briefing sheet of 10 questions and answers on the Mediation Option.
These questions ask why mediation is necessary, and how it will be
implemented. Emrich and Sweet argue that institutionalized
mediation is necessary because a recognized mediation procedure lends
legitimacy to negotiation and because most groups would be included
into the settlement process.
6. Fisher, Roger, and Ury, William. Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement
Without Giving In. page 61. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981.
Getting to YES offers a concise, step-by-step strategy for resolving
conflict. Fisher and Ury suggest using the following principles: 1.
separate the people from the problem, 2. focus on interests, not
positions, 3. invent options for mutual gain, and 4. insist on using
objective criteria. In addition, Fisher and Ury introduce the BATNA
(Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) principle by which
negotiators can evaluate possible agreements.
7. Forester, John. "How Planners Argue: Rhetorical Strategies in Planning
Practice and Issues of Substance, Power, and Passion." Working Papers in
Planning Series. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Department of City and
Regional Planning, 1987.
Forester argues that substance, power, and passion all play a role in
development negotiations. A case study is given where a developer
meets with the local planning department. Forester analyzes this
discussion and offers ideas where either party could have acted
differently to achieve a different outcome. In any development
negotiation, there is the substance of the proposal, the power struggle
between the developer and the planners and between the planners and
the local officials, and finally, there is passion; people not only have
interests, but they care about those interests as well.
8. Forester, John. Planning in the Face of Power. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1988.
This book argues that any account of planning must face political
realities such as working within political institutions, on political
issues, and on problems whose most basic technical components may
be celebrated by some and contested by others. Chapter 6 looks at
planning in the face of conflict: mediated negotiation strategies in
practice. Forester identifies six strategies that a planner can employ in
mediating local land use conflicts: 1. Planner as regulator, 2. Pre-
mediate and negotiate, 3. Planner as resource, 4. Shuttle diplomacy, 5.
Active and interested mediation, and 6. Split the job--you mediate, I'll
negotiate. In addition, Forester discusses administrative implications
for planning organizations.
9. Forester, John and David Stitzel. "Beyond Neutrality: The Possibilities of
Activist Mediation in Public Sector Conflicts." Negotiation Journal. (July,
1989).
This article explores the arguments for neutral and non-neutral
(activist) mediation in public sector disputes. Two questions are
analyzed. First, how is it possible for planners to work as mediators in
non-neutral ways? Is activist mediation simply an impossible role to
perform? Second, if planners could adopt more of less-activist
mediating roles, what difference would this make in the face of power
imbalances between conflicting parties.
10. Forester, John Envisioning the Politics of Public Sector Dispute
Resolution. Working Paper in Planning Series. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University, Department of City and Regional Planning, Dec. 1989.
Forester explores public dispute resolution through themes of
democratic political theory and republican political theory. Public
sector mediators, Forester argues, face the challenge of nurturing
deliberative processes that produce enduring agreements while being
inclusive or properly representative and sensitive to power imbalances
at the same time. In addition, Forester challenges the adequacy of
empirical approaches to the study of public dispute resolution, arguing
that normative concerns of political philosophy must be taken
seriously.
11. Gandarilla, Enrique, et al. Settling Land Use Disputes: A Guide to
Implementing Facilitation & Mediation in Local Zoning Procedures.
Medford, MA: Department of Urban & Environmental Policy, Tufts
University, 1991.
This report, prepared by four graduate students at Tufts University,
looks at institutionalizing facilitation and mediation into local zoning
hearing procedures. There is a discussion of current literature and
cases where this is being done--such as in Upper Merion Township,
PA. There is also discussion of how mediation can improve the
zoning hearing process. Finally, the authors present a model for the
use of facilitation and mediation in the Planned Unit Development
approval process in Bristol, RI.
12. Goldberg, Stephen, Eric Green, and Frank Sander. Dispute Resolution.
Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1985.
This book is an excellent overview of the field of dispute resolution. It
is written similar to law texts and gives case studies, and balanced
theory, i.e., arguments of both proponents and opponents to
alternative dispute resolution are given.
13. Goldberger, Paul. "When Developers Change the Rules During the
Game." New York Times. 19 Mar. 1989. pg. 36.
Goldberger argues that negotiations are too informal, that rules must
be spelled out clearly and followed without deal-making. Looking at
linkage programs in major cities, he argues that developers are making
the rules, not following them. Current zoning regulations seem to be a
baseline from which negotiations start. Also, there are examples of
negotiated agreements being used to forgive zoning violations. The
informality of not having a strict formula for negotiating "incentives"
seems to strengthen the developer's position, while at the same time
weakening the city's position (i.e., the city's land use regulations).
14. Gray, Barbara. Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for MultiParty
Problems. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989.
Gray describes how collaboration, a method which she describes for
solving shared problems and resolving conflicts, can be used in order
to help organizations join forces, pool information, and reach
mutually satisfying agreements. She outlines steps for undertaking a
successful collaborative effort--exploring how to get parties together in
order to define the problem, establish an agenda, and implement a
solution.
15. Harter, Philip J. "Dispute Resolution and Administrative Law: The
History, Needs, and Future of a Complex Relationship." Villanova Law
Review Vol. 29, No. 6, pp 1393-1419.
Harter argues that the administrative process may be particularly
pertinent to a general discussion of dispute resolution. As
administrative processes evolved and matured, those processes had to
struggle--and are still struggling--to define their relationship to the
courts. Thus, the "institutionalization" of dispute resolution may
learn much from the administrative process, and in turn, the
administrative process can profitably draw on the insights we are
gaining on various forms of dispute resolution.
16. Kirlin John J., and Anne M. Kirlin. Public Choices - Private Resources:
Financing Capital Infrastructure for California's Growth Through
Public/Private Bargaining. Sacramento: California Tax Foundation, 1982.
Bargaining is, and will continue to be, an important factor in the land
development process. Almost every decision point in the land
development process provides opportunity for bargaining. Six major
reasons for why bargaining is acceptable are offered: (1) constraints on
bargaining would lead to further reductions in public works, (2)
bargaining is fully consistent with strong, effective policy, (3) private
property rights are not diminished, (4) consequences of widespread use
of bargaining are acceptable, (5) because jurisdiction and developers are
risk-averse and prefer delaying capital outlays, they find many forms of
bargaining are preferable to the old instruments for providing public
works, (6) barg.ning is defensible against legal attack.
17. Levitt, Rachelle L., and John J. Kirlin, eds. Managing Development
Through Public/Private Negotiations. Washington, D.C.: Urban Land
Institute and the American Bar Association, 1985.
This book is an outgrowth of a seminar on negotiating development
approvals held by ABA's section on Urban, State, and Local
Government Law and the Urban Land Institute. It includes papers and
outlines written by the speakers at the seminar. The book's forward
states that flexible zoning and growth management being adopted by
many jurisdictions require negotiations as part of development review.
Similarly, public/private joint ventures necessitate substantial
negotiations and frequently complicated agreements. Finally, in many
cities and suburbs, large, complex projects are approved only after
protracted bargaining with neighborhood and special interest groups
and with public officials.
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18. Madigan, Denise, Gerard McMahon, Lawrence Susskind, and Stephanie
Rolley. New Approaches to Resolving Local Public Disputes.
Washington, D.C.: National Institute for Dispute Resolution, 1990.
This is a how-to-do-it report that shows how all parties with a
legitimate stake in disputes can work together in resolving them
through mediated negotiation. Six case studies establish mediation as
an efficient, practical alternative to traditional ways of resolving
disputes. Key steps common to most mediated negotiation efforts are
detailed, drawing from the case studies. A more general discussion of
when mediated negotiation might be useful and successful is given.
Finally, the kinds of costs associated with this process are identified
along with potential sources of financial support.
19. Moore, Christopher W. The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for
Resolving Conflict. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986.
This book details techniques for mediating disputes. Moore discusses
various roles of the mediator and offers a model of mediation for
discussion. He shows what to do before the actual mediation begins,
gives a step-by-step guide on conducting mediation sessions, and
desc.ibes techniques for bringing conflicts to formal settlement.
20. Rivkin, Malcolm, D. Negotiated Development: A Breakthrough in
Environmental Controversies. Washington, D.C.: Conservation
Foundation, 1977.
With increasing frequency, potential problems about the scale and
design, activity mix, land and water treatment, and other features of
major commercial, residential, and mixed-use proposals are being
settled through negotiation. Rivkin discusses the changing political
climate that led to negotiation, the roots of negotiation, and two cases
which were resolved by negotiation. Finally, Rivkin looks at essentials
for negotiation and possible limitations on negotiating development.
21. Snyder, Thomas P. and Michael A. Stegman, Paying for Growth: Using
Development Fees to Finance Infrastructure. Washington D.C.: Urban
Land Institute, 1986.
This book looks at financing capital improvements through the use of
development fees, special assessments, and exactions. Snyder and
Stegman conducted field research in Florida, California, Colorado, and
North Carolina. Throughout the book, the authors distinguish
between scheduled (pre-determined) and negotiated fees and exactions.
They argue that developers prefer the predictability of fixed fee
schedules over negotiated exactions. Also, off-site infrastructure is
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more often financed through negotiations than on-site; cities prefer not
to formalize off-site requirements because they might be illegal and
they want the flexibility associated with case-by-case negotiation.
22. Sullivan, Timothy J. Resolving Development Disputes Through
Negotiations. New York: Plenum Press, 1984.
This book examines the potential for negotiation and mediation to
resolve disputes that arise in a community over the siting and
construction of new facilities. Sullivan, in chapter 10, looks at the
design of a formal negotiation process and suggests what are the crucial
questions which must be considered in designing the process. These
questions are: 1. Which development decisions should be resolved by
negotiation, 2. What issues constitute a bargaining agenda, 3. Who
participates, 4. Who resolves procedural disputes, 5. How can
negotiations encourage p1,gress and prevent delay, 6. What
constitutes a negotiator's power and how should power be distributed,
7. How can agreements be officially recognized and disputes formally
concluded, and 8. How can one incorporate technical knowledge into
this review process.
23. Susskind, Lawrence, Lawrence Bacow, and Michael Wheeler. Resolving
Environmental Regulatory Disputes. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman
Publishing Company, 1983.
This book examines seven regulatory negotiation case studies to learn
about the obstacles to out-of-court resolution of environmental
regulatory disputes and prospects for informal dispute resolution. The
three major conclusions were that informal dispute resolution is more
effective, informal dispute resolution is more beneficial to all the
interested parties, and sometimes a mediator is necessary. In addition,
there are three underlying, cross-cutting issues: whether negotiation at
the outset leads to an expectation of compromise later, that negotiators
tend to offer packa'rs rather than focus on issues, and that negotiation
draws on the experience and judgment of all interested parties.
24. Susskind, Lawrence, and Cruikshank, Jeffrey. Breaking the Impasse:
Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes. New York: Basic
Books, 1987.
This book applies interest-based negotiation principles set forth in
Getting to YES to resolving public sector disputes. Susskind and
Cruikshank discuss possible issues, such as sunshine laws, that create
special considerations for using consensual dispute resolution
processes in the public sector. Both assisted and unassisted negotiation
is discussed. Finally, there is a chapter suggesting methods for public
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officials, business interests, and community groups to take action and
avoid some of the possible difficulties discussed earlier in the book.
25. Susskind, L.E., and Madigan, D. "New Approaches to Resolving Disputes
in the Public Sector." The Justice Systems Journal. Vol. 9, No. 2, 1984.
This paper describes a negotiated investment strategy in Malden,
Massachusetts. There were three teams (government, business, and
citizen) who negotiated spending priorities for the city government.
The actual negotiations were conducted by subgroups with
representatives from each team.
26. Tomain, Joseph, P. "Land Use Mediation for Planners." Mediation
Quarterly. vol. 7, no. 2, (Winter 1989).
Tomain discusses the benefits of using mediation as an alternative to
litigation in land use disputes. He claims that before a local body
engages in mediation, it should have legal authority--i.e., state enabling
legislation and a local ordinance. Finally, Tomain gives a model
ordinance for incorporating land use mediation into an existing
system.
27. Wheeler, Michael. "Promoting Negotiation: Yes in My Backyard." MIT
Center for Real Estate Development, Working Paper #27, Cambridge:
CRED, 1990.
This paper argues that procedures and forums can be deliberately
created to promote negotiation. This is demonstrated using a
mediation case of an intermunicipal dispute in Connecticut over
regional affordable housing problems. State legislation offered funding
priority to any region that successfully negotiated a compact. Analysis
concludes that the mediation was successful in part because barriers to
negotiation were overcome. Ten such barriers are considered.
Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zoning Act
1. DiPasquale, Denise, and Langley C. Keyes. Building Foundations:
Housing and Federal Policy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1990.
In Chapter 8, "Resolving Local Regulatory Disputes and Building
Consensus for Affordable," Michael Wheeler argues that local land use
regulation establishes the context in which development approvals are
negotiated. For example, comprehensive permitting in the Anti-Snob
Zoning Act changes the bargaining power of the various interested
parties.
103
2. Guzman, Margaret. Chapter 774: Anti-Snob Zoning Two Decades of
Impact. Wellesley, MA: Clark University (Senior Thesis), April 1989.
The author updated a 1986 statewide survey of communities charting
the use of Chapter 774. Her findings included: that the Anti-Snob
Zoning Law has not entirely satisfied the need for low and middle
income housing (LMIH), the construction of over 17,000 units may be
attributed to Chapter 774, nearly every suburb of Boston has had at least
one comprehensive permit application, and many communities are
taking the initiative to actively construct LMIH.
3. Lacasse, Cynthia D. The Anti-Snob Zoning Law: The Effectiveness of
Chapter 774 in Getting Affordable Housing Built. Cambridge, MA:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Studies and
Planning (Masters Thesis), May 1987.
Lacasse reviews the impact of Chapter 774 and concludes that a project
is much more likely to be built if the local ZBA grants a comprehensive
permit when it is first requested. The mere presence of the Housing
Appeals Committee has made it possible for many developers to go on
and build LMIH projects.
4. Lohe, Werner A., Counsel, Housing Appeals Committee, Telephone
interview, March 13, 1992.
5. Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency. Comprehensive Permit Site
and Project Approval Application.
6. Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, Appraisal and Marketing
Department. Site Approval Scoring Sheet. Rev. 10/3/88 (latest revision).
7. Massachusetts Housing Partnership. Opening Doors Housing
Innovations in Massachusetts: A Guide for Local Communities. (1989).
This booklet describes ideas, implementation strategies and
evaluations of techniques used by developers and/or communities to
provide affordable housing in Massachusetts. Sixteen projects are
described. In some projects, the town itself took the lead to
accommodate affordable housing projects. The importance of the
private sector involvement is emphasized, and the re-use of existing
structures, alternative forms of homeownership (cooperatives, land
trusts), and transitional housing are also discussed.
8. Massachusetts Housing Partnership. Pre-Development and Technical
Assistance Programs, Nov. 1991.
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This pamphlet describes current funding and technical assistance
programs for developers of affordable housing and town boards in the
communities where the projects are proposed.
9. Massachusetts, State of, Executive Office of Communities &
Development. Comprehensive Permits Chapter 40B and Regulations,
Jan 1991.
This report contains: 1. (a) Procedural Regulations of the Housing
Appeals Committee; 760 CMR 30.00 (b) Housing Appeals Committee
Criteria for Decisions under M.G.L. c. 40B §§ 20-23; 760 CMR 31.00, 2.
M.G.L. c. 40B §§ 20-23, also known as the Acts of 1969 of the Anti-Snob
Zoning Act, and 3. Model Local Rules - Comprehensive Permit Rules
of the Zoning Board of Appeals.
10. Massachusetts, State of, Executive Office of Communities &
Development. Guidelines for Local Review of Comprehensive Permits,
June 1990.
This guidebook recommends procedures for a Zoning Board of Appeals
to follow during the comprehensive permit process (scope of review,
hearing process, ZBA decision, and post-ZBA decision actions), and
discusses the most common issues and problems.
11. Massachusetts, State of, Executive Office of Communities and
Development. Local Initiative Program: Guidelines for Communities
and Application (For Comprehensive Permit Projects Only). Jan. 1992.
This booklet describes the Local Initiative Program (760 CMR 45.00) and
application requirements. The Local Initiative Program was
established to give more flexibility to cities and towns to provide low
and moderate income housing. The requirement for financial subsidy
for comprehensive permit projects may be fulfilled with technical and
other non-financial assistance provided through the Local Initiative
Program. This booklet also contains a copy of the regulations.
12. Massachusetts, State of, Office of Dispute Resolution. Agreement to
Participate in Affordable Housing Mediation Process. Revised Dec. 1989.
13. Netter, Edith. "Bridging the Housing Gap." Municipal Advocate.
This article argues that new state regulations encourage local officials
and developer to work together. The author reviews "Community
Participation in Subsidized Housing" (760 CMR 46.00 et. seq.) and the
"Local Initiative Program" (760 CMR 45.00). These regulations give
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communities more ways to satisfy state affordable housing
requirements.
14. Resnick, Lauren J. "Mediating Affordable Housing Disputes in
Massachusetts: Optimal Intervention Points." Arbitration Journal. June
1990, Vol. 45, No. 2.
This article argues that a mediation option at the local level should be
provided for developers of affordable housing. A survey of attorneys
representing developers and towns indicates that both sides would be
receptive this early intervention and that an early intervention point
would, on the whole, serve all parties' needs. The author recommends
that the Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution expand its
Affordable Housing Mediation Program to include a mediation option
for proposals while still at the Zoning Board of Appeals.
Town of Yarmouth
1. Cummaquid Hills, Various project files.
2. Dorius, Noah, consultant to the Yarmouth Fair Housing Committee,
Telephone interview, March, 18, 1992.
3. German Hill, Zoning Board of Appeals project file.
4. Kellogg, David, Town Planner, Personal Interview, April 9, 1992.
5. Shorebrook Park, Zoning Board of Appeals project file.
6. Wood, Bill, Chair, Fair Housing Committee, Personal interview, April 9,
1992.
7. Yarmouth, Town of, Planning Board. Zoning By-Law, Amended
through April, 1989 and Errata Sheets.
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